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Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets:
The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation
Arthur F. Mathews*
I. Introduction
For over fifty-five years the federal courts have been developing a
body ofjurisprudence delineating under what circumstances and in what
manner a private party plaintiff injured in a securities transaction may
recover damages or obtain other relief from various classes of defendants
including issuers, underwriters, broker-dealers and professional advisers
such as attorneys, accountants and bankers.' Federal securities law juris-
prudence has been developed primarily by courts interpreting and apply-
ing two principal federal statutes: the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933
Act") 2 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 3
As courts have shaped the contours of both express and implied
causes of action under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and have determined the
application in federal securities litigation of such derivative liability theo-
ries as aiding and abetting, conspiracy, respondeat superior and control-
ling person liability, private party plaintiffs have struggled to find the
easiest route to recover maximum damages from "deep pocket" defend-
ants. Such defendants are often persons and entities that are "outsiders"
with respect to the particular securities transactions consummated by
plaintiff.4
* Mr. Mathews, a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D. C., was Chairman of
the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law. That ABA Task Force published an extensive report on Civil RICO in 1985.
James L. O'Hara, a law clerk at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and a law student at Georgetown Law
Center, assisted in the preparation of this paper.
This article is an expansion of remarks delivered by Mr. Mathews at Notre Dame Law School on
February 8, 1990 at a symposium-Law and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO. Some of Mr.
Mathews' remarks were also covered in a speech at the Cato Institute in Washington, D. C. on Octo-
ber 18, 1989, at a symposium-RICO, Rights, and the Constitution, which will be published, as ex-
panded and edited, as Mathews, RICO's Jurisprudential Dilemma: Curtailing Civil RICO Abuse Without
Corrupting the Statute's Primary Goal of Eradicating Racketeering from Legitimate Business, - CATO J. -
(1990).
1 See, e.g., 1 & 2 T. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION VOL. 1, 279-366 (Ch. 7 "Liability
Under the Securities Act of 1933"), vol. 2, 51-219 (Ch. 13 "Implied Private Remedies") (2d ed.
1990); A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 101-5 (1990); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 13-21 (6th ed. 1987) ("Civil Liabilities Under
the Federal Securities Laws"); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 872-1050 (1988)
(Ch. 10 "Civil Liability"); D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION-MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 156-
222 ("Civil Liability under the 1933 Act"), 451-86 ("Civil Liabilities for 'Insider Trading' "), 548-
621 ("Corporate Mismanagement"), 622-55 ("Mergers and Acquisitions-Civil Liability under the
1934 Act"), 674-84 ("Litigation under the Tender Offer Provisions"), 730-86 ("Individual Liability
for Fraud and Misstatements") (2d ed.! 1980).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
4 See, e.g., Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities Laws-Charting the Proper
Course, 65 OR. L. REV. 327 (1986); Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Criti-
cal Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637 (1988); Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability In Securities Law:
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Plaintiffs' counsel began to search for new remedies in other federal
statutes to vindicate their clients' damage claims, as courts have gradually
increased the burdens of plaintiffs in pursuing the 1933 and 1934 Acts'
express and implied private damages causes of actions in the 1970s and
1980s.5 Civil RICO 6 has become one of the statutes of choice for pursu-
ing an alternative route to recovery in federal securities litigation, 7 as
Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1007
(1983); Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 80
(1981); Fitzpatrick & Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square
Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1983); Gilmore & MacBride, Liability of Finandal InstitutionsforAiding and
Abetting Violations of Securities Law, 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 811 (1985); Marshall, Control Person Liabil-
ity, 13 REv. SEC. REG. 927 (1980); Reininger, Exclusive or Concurrent-The Role of Control and Respondeat
Superior in the Imposition of Vicarious Civil Liability on Broker-Dealers, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 226 (1981); Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnifi-
cation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972); Note, Liability of Controlling Persons-Common Law
and Statutory Theories of Secondary Liability, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 621 (1975); Note, Vicarious Liability of
Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts, I 1 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 151 (1977); Note, The Burden of Controk
Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019
(1973); Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10b-5: The Recklesness Standard in Civil
Damage Actions, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1087 (1984); Note, Secondary Liability of Attorneys for Securities Law
Violations-The Need for a Single Standard of Attorney Conduct, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 65 (1983); Comment,
Rule lob-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Respondeat Superior, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1513 (1981); Comment,
Controlling Persons' Liability of Broker-Dealers for Their Employees' Federal Securities Violations, 1974 DuKa
LJ. 824; Comment, Brokerage Firms Liability for Salesmen's Fraudulent Practice, 36 FoRDHA.m L. REV. 95
(1974); Comment, The Recognition of Aiding and Abetting in the Federal Securities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REv.
821 (1986); Comment, Lender's Liability forAiding and Abetting Rule 10b-5 Violations: The Knowledge Stan-
dard, 41 Sw. L.J. 925 (1987); Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Act:
Toward an ImprovedAnalysis, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1345 (1978); cf. Markham & Meltzer, Secondary Liability
Under the Commodity Exchange Act--Respondeat Superior, Aiding and Abetting, Supervision, and Scienter, 27
EMORY LJ. 1115 (1978); Comment, The Controlling Persons Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability
Under Federal Securities Law, 18 Vii.L. L. REv. 621 (1974); Comment, Vicarious Liability For Securities Law
Violations: Respondeat Superior and the Controlling Person Sections, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 713 (1974).
5 The Supreme Court began to cut back generally on the availability of implied private damages
causes of action under federal statutes in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and Cannon v. Univ. of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Supreme Court's restrictive approach immediately began to be
applied in federal securities litigation. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Other Supreme Court decisions that have restricted coverage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in the 1970s
and 1980s include: Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
472 U.S. 1 (1985); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); and International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
6 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was enacted in 1970 as part
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Star. 941,947-48 (1970)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). Civil RICO refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), RICO's
private party treble damages provision which states:
§ 1964. Civil Remedies ... (c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
For background relating to the various aspects of the RICO statute in both its criminal and civil
contexts, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. Rv. 237 (1982); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and
the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837 (1980); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv.
291 (1983);Tarlow, RICO-The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165 (1980).
7 See generally Mathews, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEc. CORP. BAK-
ING & Bus. L. [hereinafter Civil RICO Task Force Report]. See also Blakey, supra note 6; Bridges, Private
RICO Litigation Based Upon 'Fraud in the Sale of Securities,' 18 GA. L.J. 43 (1983); Glanz, RICO and
Securities Fraud- A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1513 (1983);Johnson, Predators Rights: Multi-
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plaintiffs seek to find a "deep pocket" defendant to pay their damage
claims." The expansive use of civil RICO in securities litigation in the
1980s has spawned a new, somewhat confusing body ofjurisprudence 9 as
plaintiffs seek automatic treble damages, attorneys' fees and costs10 by
alleging patterns of so-called "commercial fraud" predicate offenses
(mail, wire and securities fraud)"I in attempting to circumvent many of
the restrictions in the complex body of federal securities law. Such cases
have involved corporate takeovers and tender offers,' 2 proxy contests,13
pe Remedies For Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Law and RICO, 10 J. CORP. L. 3 (1984); Long,
Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO
Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1981); Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act: Powerful New Tool of the Defrauded Securities Plaintif, 31 RAN. L. REV. 7 (1982); Morrison, Old
Bottle--Not So New Wine: Treble Damages in Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 10 SEc. REG. LJ. 67
(1982); Tyson & August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in Favor of Incumbent Man-
agement?, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1983); Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some Maturational Problems and
Proposals for Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285 (1983); Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. CORP. L. 411 (1983).
8 See Poker, Reaching A Deep Pocket Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72
MARQ. L. REV. 511 (1989).
9 See AMENDING THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, S. REP. No.
262, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990): "RICO introduced several new concepts and broad remedies
into the law. Twenty years later, however, the meaning of many of these concepts and remedies is
still unclear. Furthermore, the orderly development of the law has been interrupted by the filing of
inappropriate actions by private parties under Civil RICO."
10 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). See generally Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and
Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526 (1986).
11 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(B), (D) (1988). See, e.g., Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 239-
82; A. MATHEWS, FIRTH ANNUAL INsTrrtrrE, RICO LITIGATION UPDATE 389 (1989); Best & Paull, Stop-
ping Civil RICO at the Garden Gate: The Judicial Pruning of Mail and Wire Fraud as Predicate Offenses, MA-
THEWS, RICO LITIGATION UPDATE 333 (1988).
12 See, e.g., Dan River, Inc., v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); Southwest Realty, Ltd. v.
Daseke, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,256 (N.D. Tex. 1990); In re The
Evening News Ass'n Tender Offer Litig., 642 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Marshall Field & Co. v.
Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742 (N.D. Ohio 1982). See also Tyson & Ain,
RICO: The Newest Litigation Gambit in Corporate Takeover Battles, in TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND
COMMENTARIES 215 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Hatrak, Securities Law: Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: Avail-
ability of Relief Under the '34 Act, Williams Act and RICO, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 828 (1984);Johnson,
Predators Rights: Multiple Remedies For Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Law and RICO, 10 J. CORP. L.
3 (1984); Tyson & August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in Favor of Incumbent
Management?, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 53 (1983).
13 See, e.g., Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Bayly Corp. v.
Marantette, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,834 (D.D.C. 1982).
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insider-trading allegations,' 4 routine broker-dealer disputes, 15 and other
ordinary corporate/federal securities law matters. 16
However, this new body of civil RICO jurisprudence has come under
persistent attack for the past few years. The overuse or abuse of the civil
RICO treble damages cause of action in securities and other commercial
litigation was noted and criticized in 1985 in both the ABA Task Force
Report' 7 and in the Supreme Court's Sedima opinions 18 (particularly in
Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent)' 9 and has been the subject of continued
14 See, e.g., Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'ing, 672 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'ing, 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 727 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Il1. 1989); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp.
1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
15 See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Hoxworth v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990); Adrian v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc.,
841 F.2d 1059 (11th Cir. 1988); Lund v. Shearson/Lehman Am. Express, Inc., 852 F.2d 182 (6th
Cir. 1988); Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 856 F.2d 1125 (8th Cir.
1988); Gilmore v. Shearson/Lehman Am. Express, Inc., 811 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1987); Nesslage v.
York Sec., Inc., 823 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1987); Pujol v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201
(Ist Cir. 1987); Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1986); Tashea
v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337 (11 th Cir. 1986); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1986); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden,
Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d
16 (1st Cir. 1986); Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 807 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1986).
16 See, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 900 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1990),
aff'g 699 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D.N.C. 1988); In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988).
17 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1-5, 20-41, 55-69, 427-34.
18 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). In Mr.Justice White's majority opin-
ion in Sedima, the Court acknowledged the concern of the Second Circuit that civil RICO was being
put to "extraordinary, if not outrageous" uses and has become "a tool for everyday fraud cases
brought against 'respected and legitimate "enterprises",' " as well as "mobsters and organized
criminals." However, the majority felt the problems with overuse of the statute had to be corrected
by Congress, not by the courts:
It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely against
... [legitimate business] defendants, rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mob-
ster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction
must lie with Congress ....
We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into some-
thing quite different from the original conception of is enactors. See generally ABA [Civil
RICO Task Force] Report, at 55-69. Though sharing the doubts of the Court of Appeals
about this increasing divergence, we cannot agree with either its diagnosis or its remedy.
The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result
of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail and securi-
ties fraud, and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
Ipattern.'
473 U.S. at 499-500 (footnote omitted).
19 Mr. Justice Marshall, in his stinging dissent in Sedima, pointed out in detail how civil RICO,
through its mail and wire fraud predicates, was being overused or abused in all sorts of commercial
litigation, including routine securities and commodities disputes:
1990]
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debate in Congress since 1985.20 Academics and scholars have sug-
gested a wide array of legislative reforms for civil RICO. 21 Even Chief
Justice Rehnquist has called for congressional action to cure any per-
ceived abuse or overuse of the statute.22
It is likely that Congress may soon succeed in amending the RICO
statute to narrow the scope of the 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) civil treble dam-
ages remedy, thereby curtailing abusive use of civil RICO. It is unlikely,
however, that any legislative amendments will eliminate or narrow the
commercial fraud predicate offenses, i.e., mail, wire and securities
fraud. 23 Consequently, it seems clear that the plaintiff's bar will continue
The Court's interpretation of the civil RICO statute quite simply revolutionizes private
litigation; it validates the federalization of broad areas of state common law of frauds, and it
approves the displacement of well-established federal remedial provisions....
The single most significant reason for the expansive use of civil RICO has been the
presence in the statute, as predicate acts, of mail and wire fraud violations....
The civil RICO provision.., stretches the mail and wire fraud statutes to their absolute
limits and federalizes important areas of civil litigation that until now were solely within the
domain of the States.
The dislocations caused by the Court's reading of the civil RICO provision are not just
theoretical. In practice, this provision frequently has been invoked against legitimate busi-
ness in ordinary commercial settings. As the Court recognizes, the ABA Task Force that
studied civil RICO found that 40%o of the reported cases involved securities fraud, 37%
involved common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting .... Many a prudent de-
fendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus
not surprising that civil RICO has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very
evils that it was designed to combat. Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 69 (1985).
473 U.S. at 501-506.
20 See, e.g., RICO Reform: Hearings on H.R. 2517, H.R. 2943, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391,
and H.R. 5445 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judicialy, H.R. REP. No. 140,
99th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., House Rep. Serial No. 140 (1987) (covering RICO reform legislation
hearings held at various times from June 1985 through July 1986); Oversight on Civil RICO Suits:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, S. REP. No. 37, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Rep.
Serial No.J-99-37 (1986) (covering Oversight on civil RICO Suits Brought Under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c)
hearings held at various times from May through September 1985); AMENDING THE RACKETEER IN-
FLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, SEN. REP. No. 269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (April 24,
1990). Cf. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S USE OF THE RICO STATUTE AND OTHER EFFORTS AGAINST ORGAN-
IZED CRIME, SEN. REP. No. 407, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 1, 1990); AMENDING THE RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS Aar, S. REP. No. 459, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 8,
1988).
21 For various proposals about amending the RICO statute, see Reforming RICO: If Why and
How? 43 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1990), particularly the following articles: Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of
the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals For Reform: 'Mother of God-Is This
the End of RICO?' id. at 851; Getzendauner,Judicial 'Pruning' of 'Garden Variety Fraud' Civil RICO Cases
Does Not Work: It's Time For Congress to Act, id. at 673; Goldsmith & Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The
Gatekeeper Concept, id. at 735; Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed?, id. at 639; Lynch, A Concep-
tual Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, id. at 769; Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Com-
ment on Civil RICO's Remedial Provisions, id. at 623; Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, id. at 691.
See also Boucher, Civil RICO: A Statute Out of Control, in THE RICO RACKET 55 (G. McDowell ed.
1989); Abrams, A New Proposal For Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1989); Note, The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Propo-
sal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1980).
22 Rehnquist, Remarks of the ChiefJustice on Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5
(1989), reprinted as Rehnquist on RICO, 9 RICO LAw REP. 923 (1989) (published version of Remarks
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist at Brookings Institute Conference (April 1989)).
23 Congressman William J. Hughes, Chair, Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judici-
ary, U. S. House of Representatives, stated on Nov. 10, 1989, after acknowledging the breadth of the
mail, wire and securities fraud predicate offenses: "There is, however, little or no support in Con-
[Vol. 65:896
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to pursue civil RICO remedies in a broad range of corporate/securities
cases in the decade of the 1990s, despite Mr. Justice Marshall's observa-
tions in his Sedima dissent that it would be jurisprudentially inadvisable to
allow civil RICO to disrupt and displace over a half century of judicial
development of civil remedies under the federal securities laws:
In addition to altering fundamentally the federal-state balance in
civil remedies, the broad reading of the civil RICO provision also dis-
places important areas of federal law. For example, one predicate of-
fense under RICO is 'fraud in the sale of securities.' 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1988). By alleging two instances of such fraud, a plaintiff
might be able to bring a case within the scope of the civil RICO provi-
sion. It does not take great legal insight to realize that such a plaintiff
would pursue his case under RICO rather than do so solely under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
provide both express and implied causes of action for violations of the
federal securities laws. Indeed, the federal securities laws contemplate
only compensatory damages and ordinarily do not authorize recovery
of attorney's fees. By invoking RICO, in contrast, a successful plaintiff
will recover both treble damages and attorney's fees....
More importantly, under the Court's interpretation, the civil
RICO provision does far more than just increase the available dam-
ages. In fact, it virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial
development of civil remedies under the federal securities laws. Over
the years, courts have paid close attention to matters such as standing,
culpability, causation, reliance and materiality; as well as the defini-
tions of "securities" and "fraud." See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). All of this law is now an endangered
species because plaintiffs can avoid the limitations of the securities
laws merely by alleging violations of other predicate acts. For exam-
ple, even in cases in which the investment instrument is not a "secur-
ity" covered by the federal securities laws, RICO will provide a treble
damage remedy to a plaintiff who can prove the required pattern of
mail or wire fraud. Cf Crocker National Bank v. Rockwell International
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Before RICO, of course, the
plaintiff could not have recovered under federal law for the mail or
wire fraud violation.
Similarly, a customer who refrains from selling a security during a
period in which its market value was declining could allege that, on
two occasions, his broker recommended by telephone, as part of a
scheme to defraud, that the customer not sell the security. The cus-
tomer might thereby prevail under civil RICO, even though, as neither
a purchaser nor a seller, he would not have had standing to bring an
action under the federal securities laws. See also 741 F.2d 482, 499
(1984) ('two misstatements in a proxy solicitation could subject any
director in any national corporation to 'racketeering' charges and the
threat of treble damages and attorneys fees).24
gress to delete mail and wire fraud laws from RICO. One of the main reasons for this lack of support
is the adamant opposition to any such change by the Department ofJustice because mail and wire
fraud predicates predominate in criminal RICO cases. Therefore, solutions to the problems must
come from elsewhere." Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. RV. 639, 642
(1990).
24 473 U.S. 479, 504-6 (1985). Mr. Justice Marshall added:
The effect of civil RICO on federal remedial schemes is not limited to securities laws. For
example, even though commodities fraud is not a predicate offense listed in § 1961, the
1990]
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To appreciate the significance of Mr. Justice Marshall's comments
about the untoward effects civil RICO is having on the jurisprudence of
federal securities litigation, it is helpful to briefly review the available ex-
press and implied private damages remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Thus, Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the requirements
and judicial development of the principal private plaintiff causes of action
under the federal securities laws. Part III discusses the legislative history
of the inclusion of the commercial fraud predicate offenses (mail, wire
and securities fraud) in the RICO statute and their expansive use in se-
curities litigation and related corporate/commercial litigation in the
1980s. Part IV considers the various advantages to a plaintiff in pursuing
a cause of action under civil RICO, as opposed to or in addition to assert-
ing traditional federal securities laws claims, and the complexities and
confusion that RICO presents in securities cases. The article concludes
in Part V with the proposition that the proper jurisprudential solution to
civil RICO's circumvention of the federal securities laws and related or
comparable federal statutes or regulatory schemes, lies in the legislative
deletion from the RICO statute of the private civil damage cause of ac-
tion based on commercial fraud predicate offenses. In its place, Con-
gress should enact a modern federal commercial fraud statute containing
an express private damage cause of action.25
II. Private Plaintiff Causes of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws
Most suits by private plaintiffs for damages resulting from securities
transactions are filed under one or more of four principal provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, namely sections 11, 12(1) and 12(2) of the 1933
Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act as fleshed out by rule lOb-5 there-
under.26 The 1933 Act provisions-sections 11, 12(1) and 12(2)-pro-
carefully crafted private damage causes of action under the Commodity Exchange Act may
be circumvented in a commodities case through civil RICO actions alleging mail or wire
fraud.
See, e.g. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
25 See Mathews, RICO's Jurisprudential Dilemma: Curtailing Civil RICO Abuse Without Corrupting the
Statute's Primary Goal of Eradicating Racketeering From Legitimate Business, - CATO J. - (1990).
26 Other liability provisions that may supply private plaintiffs with a damages or a rescission
remedy do exist. They include both express and implied causes of action. For example, some courts
have allowed an implied private damages cause of action for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q(a) (1988). See, e.g., Craighead v. E. F. Hutton Co., 899 F.2d
485, 492 (6th Cir. 1990); Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 698 F.2d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 1983); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. National Student Mktg.
Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 350 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). See also, Note, Securities Regulation-Punitive Damages Under
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 11 B.C. INDUs. & CoM. L. REV. 1031 (1970). However, the trend of
recent authority is to deny an implied private damages action under § 17(a). Seven circuits (fourth,
fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh) have recently rejected such implied remedy. See
Bath v. Bushkin, Gains, Gaines &Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990); Shears v. Likens, 912 F.2d
889 (7th Cir. 1990); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1104-07 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Currie v.
Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 783-85 (1lth Cir. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power
Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804
F.2d 1041, 1043 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389 (5th Cir.
1982). The Second Circuit now leaves the question open. See Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902
F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d
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vide express remedies for injured purchasers of securities in fraudulent or
13, 25 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987). The confusion is caused in part by the fact
that the Supreme Court has left the question open in five different opinions since 1975. See Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304 n.9 (1985); Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975). See also Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and
Section 17(a) of The Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641 (1978); Horton, Section 1 7 (a) of the 1933
Act: The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 44 (1973); Steinberg, Section 17(a) of The
Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. LJ. 163 (1979); Note, Implied Civil Remedies
Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 53 B.U.L. REv. 70 (1973); Note, What Did Congress Really
Want?: An Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, 63 IND. LJ. 623
(1988).
Customers of broker-dealer firms that are members of a stock exchange, sometimes may have an
implied cause of action for damages under § 6 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988), against the
stock exchange for failing to enforce its rules against the member broker-dealer firm. See, e.g.,
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 372 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974);
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Hughes v. Dempsey-
Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 165 nA (9th Cir. 1976); Weinberger v. NYSE, 403 F. Supp. 1020, 1028
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rich v. NYSE, 379 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 153 (2d
Cir. 1975); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 373 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pettit v.
AMEX, 217 F. Supp. 21, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); but see Brawner v. Options Clearing Corp., 807 F.2d
297, 299, 302 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987); Walck v. AMEX, 687 F.2d 778, 780,
783 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 760-61 (2d Cir.
1977); Murphy v. McDonnell & Co., 553 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1977); Areil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d
774, 783 (2d Cir. 1977); Lank v. NYSE, 548 F.2d 61, 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Dropkin, National
Securities Exchange Liability to Public Investors: Time to Overcome Inertia?, 56 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 419 (1981);
Lashbrooke, Implying a Cause of Action for Damages: Rule Violations by Registered Exchanges and Association,
48 U. CIN. L. REv. 949 (1979); Note, Private Actions for Violations of Securities Exchange Rules: Liability for
Nonenforcement and Noncompliance, 88 COLUm. L. REv. 610 (1988); Note, Implied Private Rights of Action
Under Section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1047 (1982); Comment,
Exchange Liability for Improper Enforcement of its Constitution and Rules: The Investor's Right of Action Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 24 EMORY LJ. 865 (1975). It is unclear whether customers have
implied causes of action against broker dealers for violations of rules of stock exchanges or the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). See, e.g., Allen, Liability Under the Securities Ex-
change Act for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAw. 1493 (1970); Hoblin, A Stock Broker's
Implied Liability to Its Customers for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
253 (1970); Lowenfels, Liability Under Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private
Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 633 (1966); McLean, Brohers'Liabilityfor Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DEN. U.L. REv.
63 (1970); Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Stan-
dards, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 435 (1977); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member Liability for Viola-
tion of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1120 (1970); Annotation, Private Federal Right of Action
Against Brokerage Firm for Violation of Exchange or Dealer Association Rule, 54 A.L.R. FED. 11 (1981); Note,
Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L. REv. 828 (1970); Note,
Implied Civil Liability Arising From Violation of NASD Rules, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 151 (1975); Note, Civil
Liability for Violation of NASD Rules, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 388 (1977); Comment, Private Actions Under the
Suitability and Supervisions Duties of Exchange and Dealer Association Rules: The Fraud Requirement, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 773 (1979). The overwhelming trend of the cases in recent years deny injured inves-
tors an implied private damages cause of action against a broker-dealer for violations of rules of the
NASD, stock exchanges, and other comparable self-regulatory agencies. See cases cited at 1 T. HA-
ZEN, supra note 1, at 559 n.9, 590 n.19. But see Woods v. Piedmonte, 676 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (court recognizes implied private damages cause of action).
Early cases granted customers of broker-dealers an implied cause of action for damages under
§ 7 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 g (1988), against a broker-dealer who violated the margin rules,
i.e., Regulations T, U, G and Z promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board. However, recent cases
reject an implied damages cause of action under § 7. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States Trust Co.,
770 F.2d 308, 311-13 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Brassler v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 715 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1983); Walck v. AMEX, 687 F.2d 778.(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 942 (1983); Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 1981); Gutter v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194, 1199 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982);
Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1074-93 (4th Cir. 1979); Utah
State Univ. of Agric. & Applied Science v. Bear, Steams & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 169-71 (10th Cir.
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defective sales transactions. Section 11 imposes civil damages liability
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). See also Climan, Civil Liability Under the Credit-Regulation Provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 206 (1978); Kanouse, Rise and Fall of the
Private Cause of Action for Violation of Margin Requirements, 98 BANKING L.J. 133 (1981); Note, Civil Liabil-
ity for Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(l) and Regulation X, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 63 (1974).
Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988), provides an express damages remedy for
certain manipulative activities involving exchange-listed securities. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979); Shull v. Dail, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951); Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions, 45 VA. L. REV.
907 (1959).
Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988), and rule 14(a)(9) thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990), relating to misstatements and omissions in proxy solicitations, gives rise
to an implied private damages cause of action. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). See also Note, Securities Regulation-Shareholder Derivative Suits Under Rule 14a-9, 49 N.C.L. REv.
215 (1970).
Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988), proscribes fraud and manipulation in
connection with a tender offer. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985);
Junewitz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 TEx. L. REv.
1171 (1984). Most courts have recognized an implied remedy under § 14(e) for the target company
and its shareholders. See, e.g., Schlesinger Inv. Partnership v. Flom Corp., 671 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1981); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981); Note, Securities Law: Implied Causes of Action Under
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 66 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1982). However, the Supreme Court has
denied an implied § 14(e) remedy to a competing offeror. Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S.
1 (1977); Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34
Bus. LAw. 117 (1978). See also L. LOWENSTEIN, Private Litigation Under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act,
in TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 155 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Steinberg, Fidu-
ciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contests for Corporate Control, 30 EMORY LJ. 169
(1981).
It is unclear whether there exist implied private damages causes of action for violations of the
ownership reporting and tender offer filing provisions of §§ 13(d), 13(e), and 14(d) of the 1934 Act,
although injunctive relief may be an available private party implied remedy pursuant to these provi-
sions. See cases cited and related commentary in I T. HAZEN, supra note 1, § 11.18, at 735-39 nn.22-
36. However, false filings under these provisions will trigger an express private party damages cause
of action under § 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r. (1988); cf. Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67
VA. L. REv. 553 (1981); Hazen, The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed? 30
EMORY LJ. 5 (1981); Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a
Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980); Steinberg,
The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557
(1982).
There are a series of rules governing the conduct of broker-dealers that the SEC has promul-
gated pursuant to various subsections of § 15(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1988). Some-
times courts approve implied private party damages remedies pursuant to certain of these rules. See 5
A. JACOBS, LrrATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE lOb-5 § 3.02[f]; see also Rediker, Civil Liability of
Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REV. 15 (1969); Roach, The Suitability
Obligations of Brokers: Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1067 (1978);
Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority
of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-regulatory Requirements, 17 W. RES. L.
REV. 925 (1966); Note, The Suitability Rule: Should a Private Right of Action Exist? 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
493 (1981).
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) provides an express remedy for issuers
to recover illegal short-swing profits from certain statutorily defined insiders-officers, directors and
10 percent security holders. See, e.g., Cook and Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act (Parts I and II), 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 612 (1953); Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1975); Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. Scs. L. REv. 209 (1987); Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in
Determining Insider Liabilities Inder Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949 (1959).
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988), provides an express cause of action for
any purchaser or seller of a security who relied on a material misstatement in a filing under the 1934
Act that affected the price of the security in question. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ross v. A.H. Robins, 607 F.2d 545 (2d
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upon a specifically defined class of persons who prepare and sign mis-
leading 1933 Act registration statements filed with the SEC to cover pub-
lic offerings of securities. Section 12(1) imposes rescission or damages
liability upon anyone who offers or sells a security in violation of the re-
gistration provisions of section 5 of the 1933 Act. Section 12(2) imposes
similar rescission or damages liability upon anyone who offers or sells a
security by means of material misrepresentations or omissions of mate-
rial fact, regardless of whether the registration requirements apply to the
sales transaction. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule lOb-5 thereun-
der, contain general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation proscriptions in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Section 10(b) con-
tains no express private damages or rescission remedy; however, courts
have implied a private damages cause of action under rule lOb-5 in favor
of any purchaser or seller who is injured as a result of fraudulent or ma-
Cir. 1979); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Fischman v. Ra ytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951) (filing with stock exchange rather than SEC is sufficient for liability); Note,
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bite Back Into the Toothless Tiger, 47 FoRDHAm L.
REv. 15 (1978); Note, The Exclusivity of the Express Remedy Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 845 (1978); Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Documents Filed
Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YAE LEJ. 456 (1935). ,
Section 20A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (1988), added to the statute in the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, provides an evpress cause of action to "con-
temporaneous traders" against persons involved in illegal insider-trading. This provision was added
to the 1934 Act to specifically overrule Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984) which denied a comparable implied private damage remedy under Rule
1Ob-5. See INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910,
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26-27 (1988). Section 20A contains several limitations on liability, set forth
in Section 20A(b):
(b) Limitations on Liability.-
(1) Contemporaneous Trading Actions Limited to Profit Gained or Loss Avoided.-
The total amount of damages imposed under subsection (a) shall not exceed the
profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that are the subject
of the violation.
(2) Offsetting Disgorgements Against Liability.-The total amount of damages im-
posed against any person under subsection (a) shall be diminished by the amounts,
if any, that such person may be required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order
obtained at the instance of the Commission, in a proceeding brought under section
21(d) of this title relating to the same transaction or transactions.
(3) Controlling Person Liability.-No person shall be liable under this section solely by
reason of employing another person who is liable under this section, but the liabil-
ity of a controlling person under this section shall be subject to section 20(a) of this
title.
(4) Statute of Limitations-No action may be brought under this section more than 5
years after the date of the last transaction that is the subject of the violation.
Tippers have joint and several liability with tippees who effectuate the illegal trading. See
§ 20A(c) (1988). The § 20A(c) remedy is not exclusive. Section 20A(d) provides that plaintiffs, in
addition to a § 20A claim, retain the right to take advantage of"the availability of any cause of action
implied from a provision of this title [the 1934 Act]."
Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (b) (1988), provides that contracts involving
performance that would be in violation of the 1934 Act are void. Some courts have found an implied
right for rescission or damages under § 29(b). See, e.g., Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real
Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 752 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1985)
(rescission); Geismer v. Goodwin, 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (damages). The Supreme
Court has held that a similar provision-§ 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-15 (1988), supports an implied private right of action for rescission. Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S- 11 (1979), on remand, 610 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally
Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened,
48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1979).
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nipulative activity in connection with a securities purchase or sale
transaction.
The language of these statutory provisions and this rule, coupled
with over fifty-five years of extensive judicial development and construc-
tion, provide both private plaintiffs and defendants with a substantial de-
gree of clarity and specificity as to when a private damages cause of
action does or does not lie under the federal securities laws. 27 To date,
neither the language of the RICO statute nor judicial exposition thereof
provides concomitant clarity or specificity as to when a civil RICO treble
damages cause of action will, or will not, be available in a federal securi-
ties case.
A. Section 11 of the 1933 Act 28
Section 11 of the 1933 Act creates an express cause of action for dam-
ages for purchasers of securities in an SEC-registered public offering
when the relevant registration statement contains false or misleading
statements of material fact or omissions of material fact.29 Materiality
under the securities laws is either a question of fact, or a mixed question
27 See, e.g., Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLuM. L. REV. 393 (1938); Cobine, Elements of
Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lOb-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 651; Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE LJ. 171 (1933); Green, Civil Liability to Stockholders Under the Securities Act
of 1933 and Remedy By Class Action, 2 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 34 (1965); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule
lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 171 (1964); Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section
12(2) and How It Compares With Rule lOb-5, 13 Hous. L. REV. 231 (1976); Peterson, Recent Developments
in Civil Liabilities Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 5 Hous. L. REV. 274 (1967); Ruder,
Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 1Ob-5, 59 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1985 (1964); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE LJ. 227 (1933); Steinberg,
Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33 (1979); Weiskopf, Reme-
dies Under Rule lOb-5, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 733 (1971); Note, Rule lOb-5: The In Pari Delicto and
Unclean Hands Defense, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1149 (1970); Note, The Liability of Directors and Officers for
Misrepresentation in the Sale of Securities, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (1934); Note, Section 19(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act: A 'Legislative Chaperon'for Rule 10b-5, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 499 (1968); Note, Private
Rights From Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454 (1968); Note, Manip-
ulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 651 (1951); Note, Civil Liability
Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REv. 537 (1956); Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy
Violations, 80 YALE LJ. 107 (1970); Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: A Suggestion
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965); Note, Applicability of Waiver Estoppe4 and
Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, 73 YALE LJ. 1477 (1964);
Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120
(1950); Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MicH. L. REV. 680 (1964); Comment,
Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 121
(1962); Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Documents Filed Under Securities Act and Securities
Exchange Act, 44 YALE LJ. 456 (1935).
28 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Beecher v. Able,
435 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aft'd, 575 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1978); Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); See also Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case (Parts 1 & 2), 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 199 (1969); Heller, Weiss, Israel & Schwartz, BarChris: A Dialogue
on a Bad Case Making Hard Law, 57 GEO. LJ. 221 (1968); Note, Causation of Damages Under Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 82 HARv. L. REV. 908 (1969); Note, Causation of Damages Under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 217 (1976); Symposium, The BarChris Case, 24 Bus. LAw. 523
(1969); Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1411 (1968). Cf. Steinberg, The
Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557
(1982); Hazen, Allocation ofJurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts For Private Remedies Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C.L. REV. 707 (1982).
29 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
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of fact and law, and must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff °3 0 Any
person acquiring a security under the defective registration statement
can bring a damages action unless it can be demonstrated that the pur-
chaser knew of the misstatement or omission at the time of the
purchase. 3' Reliance on the material misstatement or omission is pre-
sumed.3 2 But the purchaser must demonstrate that the securities are
traceable directly to the particular offering covered by the registration
statement in question.33 An action must be brought within one year of
the discovery of the misstatement or omission but not more than three
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public.34 It may be
brought in either state or federal court.3 5
The permissible class of defendants in a section 11 case is quite nar-
row, since the statutory provision on its face is expressly limited to the
issuer, directors (including those persons "about to become" directors),
signers of the registration statement, underwriters and certain experts.3 6
Thus, common law aiding and abetting principles may not be used to
expand or extend section 11 liability to such outsiders as attorneys or
bankers who have not signed the registration statement or rendered an
expert opinion on a portion thereof.3 7 However, liability can be ex-
panded under section 15 to cover all controlling persons who can not
establish a good faith defense.38 Defendants' liability under section 11 is
30 See TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (mixed question offact and law); Kronfeld v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 731-32 (2d Cir. 1977) (question of fact); Ackerman v. Oryz
Communications, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd and remanded, 810 F.2d 336 (2d
Cir. 1987) (question offact); United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("The matter of
materiality may ultimately resolve itself into a question of law or one of fact, or a mixed question of
law and fact.").
31 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). See supra note 28.
32 See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
33 See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp.
1375 (D. Minn. 1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1985); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 870 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
34 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988). See Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308
(9th Cir. 1982).
35 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988). This section provides in part that federal and state courts possess
concurrent jurisdiction over any violations of the 1933 Act or the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. See Hazen, supra note 28.
36 The experts specified in § 11 include every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person
whose profession gives authority to statements made by him, who has with consent been named in
the registration statement as having prepared or certified any part of the filing, or any report or
evaluation used in connection with the registration statement. It is significant that attorneys are not
expressly named in § 11. Thus, an attorney does not have § 11 liability merely by reason of prepar-
ing a registration statement for an issuer. But an attorney may assume § 11 liability if he is a direc-
tor, a signer, or if he renders an expert opinion included in the registration statement or otherwise
consents to "expertise" a portion thereof. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
37 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 n.11, 382 n.13, 386 n.22
(1983); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F.2d 631, 642 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Hagert v. Glickman,
Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (D. Minn. 1981).
38 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988). Whether respondeat superior or other common law agency princi-
ples can help a plaintiff circumvent a controlling person's good faith defense under § 15 is unclear.
Cf- Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1986); Hatrock v. Edward D.Jones & Co., 750
F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1981); Marbury Inc. v.
Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 111
(5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 634 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1980); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594
F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979); Holloway v. Howerd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
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joint and several, with a right to contribution from other permissible
defendants .9
Persons such as lawyers who prepare or render advice in the prepa-
ration of a registration statement, but do not sign it or give an expert
opinion on a portion thereof, can not be liable under section 11. Ac-
countants and attorneys only become liable for the specific content of the
registration statement by signing the statement, performing an audit, or
rendering an expert opinion.40 All defendants except the issuer, who re-
mains strictly liable, also possess certain statutory "due diligence" de-
fenses which protect them from liability.4 1
Successful plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages unless
the defendant can demonstrate that the decline in value is not attribut-
able to the misstatement or omission in the registration statement.4 2 A
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Kamen & Co v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th
Cir. 1967); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974). See also I T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at
348-50.
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988). See also, Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifidng and Insuring Direc-
tors: Protection Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DuKE LJ. 1153; Bishop, Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J.
1078 (1968); Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light
of BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681 (1969); Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses
in Underwriting Agreements, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 223 (1986); Note, The Role of Contribution in Determining
Underwriters' Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 63 VA. L. REV. 79 (1977); Note,
Indemnification of Underwriters of§ 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406 (1963). Cf. Fischer,
Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAw. 1821 (1978).
40 See Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Or. 1985); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Minn. 1984); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 643-47 (N.D.
Cal. 1980), reh'g granted, 581 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 361-66
("Special Problems of Attorneys (and Other Professionals)"); ABA National Institute, Advisors to
Management: Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw. I (Special Ed. 1975);
Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Responsibility, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247 (1980).
41 Section 1 I(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1988). Section lI(b)(3) requires that the defendant
perform a "reasonable investigation," possess reasonable ground to believe, and believe, at the time
such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and
that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
statements therein not misleading, with regard to information in the registration statement pur-
ported to be made with the defendant's authority. It further requires that the defendant have no
reasonable ground to believe, and not believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements made therein were untrue or that there was an omission to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, with regard to any part of the registration statement made by another. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.176 (1990). See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Section 11(b)(1) and (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1) and (2), also contain certain "whistle blowing"
defenses. See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 295-96. However, such whistle blowing might cause
serious ethical or professional problems for an attorney involved in preparing the registration state-
ment. Id. at 296 n.5. See also Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
42 Section 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988), provides in part that a plaintiffis entitled to damages
which represent,
the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which
the security was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was
brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of in the market
before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but
before judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference
between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was
offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought: Provided,
That if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other than
the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the registration state-
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general market decline resulting from various economic and political fac-
tors can be sufficient evidence to preclude recovery.43 In addition, under
section 11 (e) a court may require the posting of a bond and the payment
of costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, if it finds that "the suit or
the defense was without merit."44 This provision also applies to section
12(1) and 12(2) actions.45
B. Section 12 of the 1933 Act 46
Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act provides that anyone who offers or
sells a security in violation of the registration requirements of section 547
is liable for rescission or damages to persons purchasing such secirity
from the violator. Section 12(2) creates an express private right of action
for rescission or damages in favor of the purchaser of a security when
material misstatements or omissions have been made in the offer or sale
of such security regardless of the registration requirements. 48 Since the
ment, with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.
See also Note, Causation of Damages Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 217
(1976).
43 See Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 586; Collins v. Signetics, 605 F.2d 110 (3rd Cir. 1979); In re Fortune
Systems Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), af'd in part, 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1987); Grossman v. Waste
Mgt., 589 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Itel Sec. Litig. 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re
Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Fox v. Glickman, 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
44 Section 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)(1988), states in part:
In any suit under this or any other section of this title the court may, in its discretion,
require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable attor-
ney's fee, and ifjudgment shall be rendered against a party litigant, upon the motion of the
other party litigant, such costs may be assessed in favor of such party litigant (whether or
not such undertaking has been required) if the court believes the suit or the defense to have
been without merit ....
45 IE See also text and notes at 1 T. HAzEN, supra note 1, § 7.4.2, at 310-13 nn.1-24.
46 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988). See also Klock, Promoter Liability and In Pari Delicto Under Section 12(1),
17 SEC. REC. LJ. 53 (1989); O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seler, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921 (1984); Rapp, Expanded Liability Under
Section 12 of the Securities Act: When is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 445 (1977);
Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Privity Requirement in the Contemporary Securities Law
Perspective, 51 TENN. L. REv. 235 (1984); Silverstein, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 36 VAD. L. REV. 361 (1983).
47 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). There is no implied private damages cause of action for a Section 5
violation; Section 12(1) is the exclusive private remedy for registration violations under the 1933
Act. See Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 687 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. La. 1988).
48 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988), it its entirety, states:
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e [Section 5] of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77c
[Section 3] of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said subsection, by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication,-which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less
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plaintiff must be a purchaser of the security in question, a private cause
of action under section 12 arises only when a securities sale is involved.49
A section 12(1) claim must be brought within one year of the viola-
tion upon which it is based but not more than three years after the secur-
ity was bona fide offered to the public.50 A 12(2) claim must be brought
within one year of the discovery of the misstatement or omission but not
more than three years after the sale in question.5 ' If the plaintiff still
owns the security, he must tender it to the defendant upon filing his com-
plaint, in both a section 12(1) and a section 12(2) claim. 52
Section 12 requires a defendant to be a "seller" of the security. The
statutory language expressly applies to "any person who offers or sells"; it
does not contain rule 10b-5's broad, elastic "in connection with" a
purchase or sale language. Nevertheless, over the years, courts have held
that in addition to the actual seller, section 12 encompasses any person
"whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in
causing the transaction to take place 53 -potentially embracing attorneys,
accountants, bankers and other "outsiders. ' 54 However, in 1988 in
Pinter v. Dahl,55 the Supreme Court abruptly narrowed the scope of
"seller" under section 12 by rejecting any "substantial-factor" test.
Thus, any precedent on this issue prior to the Pinter decision may be
the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for dam-
ages if he no longer owns the security.
49 Traditional agency principles apply in determining purchaser status. See Monetary Mgt.
Group v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 604 F. Supp. 764, 767 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
50 Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
51 Id Plaintiff must both plead and prove compliance with the § 13 statute of limitations to
prevail on a cause of action under either § 12(l) or § 12(2). See, e.g., Toombs v. Leone, 777 F.2d 465
(9th Cir. 1985); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Platsis v.
E. F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich. 1986), aft'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988); Krome v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 637 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Chan-
dler v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
824 F.2d 973 (1 1th Cir. 1987). The "equitable tolling" doctrine does not apply to Section 12(1)
claims, but does apply to Section 12(2) claims as well as Section 11 claims. See text and cases cited at
1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, § 7.5.4., at 335-44 (2d ed. 1990).
52 See, e.g., Kilmartin v. H. C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604 (D. Mass. 1984).
53 Several Fifth Circuit cases illustrate this holding. See Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980).
54 See, e.g., O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The
Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921 (1984); Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933: The Privity Requirement in the Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L. REV. 235 (1984).
See also Wilson v. Ruffa Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1988), opinion vacated but holding aft'd, 872
F.2d 1124 (2d. Cir. 1989) (attorney); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (attor-
ney);Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th
Cir. 1981) (attorney); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorney & accountant); Alton
Box Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977); Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) (brokers); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422
F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969) (attorney); Lubin
v. Sykedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (appraisers and accountants); In re Activision
Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (officers and directors of issuer; underwriters; account-
ants; venture capital investors); Seidel v. Public Serv. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H. 1985) (attor-
neys); Excalibur Oil, Inc., v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (attorney); Koehler v.
Pulvers, 606 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (attorney); Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal.
1983), afftd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (bank and title company); Hager v. Glickman, 520 F. Supp.
1028 (D. Minn. 1981); In re N. Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Litig., 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D.Ga. 1981);
see also Prentice & Thompson, The Legal Blitz Against Accountants: An Analysis of Section 12, 76 Ky. L.J.
345 (1988).
55 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
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invalid. Pinter was a section 12(1) case, but it has an a fortiori application
to section 12(2). The Pinter Court squarely held that permissible defend-
ants under section 12 must have directly and actively participated in the sale in
question.56 Assistance in the preparation of offering material is not suffi-
cient by itself to establish liability.5 7 In addition, the defendant must be
motivated at least in part by a desire to further his own financial interests
or those of the owner of the securities.58
Professor Hazen notes:
Many of the cases imposing liability on accountants, attorneys,
and underwriters were decided prior to Pinter v. Dahl and applied an
expansive definition of 'seller' using the 'substantial factor' test. The
Supreme Court has since rejected that test in Pinter v. Dahl, in favor of
one which requires that a defendant is a section 12 'seller' only when
acting to further its own or the securities owner's financial interest
from the sale. By shifting the focus from the defendant's relationship
with the transaction to the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff,
the Court has nullified much of the previous case law. Thus, the Court
may have practically eliminated advisers such as accountants and law-
yers from section 12 liability, since in most cases they will not have the
requisite financial interest in the sale. The language of Pinter, which
is sympathetic towards accountants and lawyers, supports this
conclusion.. .."59
Like section 11, liability under section 12 may be expanded to in-
clude controlling persons as provided by section 15.60 However, in light
of the restrictive nature of the Pinter v. Dahl holding and the specific lim-
iting language of section 12, it is likely that liability based on aiding and
abetting principles will be denied. Prior to Pinter, some courts had ac-
cepted "aiding and abetting" liability in section 12 cases based on a rule
lOb-5 aiding and abetting analogy.61 "However, the better view is that
56 Id at 648-54. The Court relied on traditional statutory interpretation principles and held that
broad or remedial goals of the Securities Act are insufficient justification for expansion of liability
beyond the scope which the specific language and statutory scheme reasonably permit. See also, I T.
HAZEN, supra note 1, at 285-86 (footnotes omitted):
The Court in Pinter indicated that a Section 12 defendant must have been both an immedi-
ate and direct seller of the securities to the plaintiff. The Court stressed that Section 12
liability depends on the defendant having been more than a remote participant in the sale.
Thus, merely participating in the preparation of the registration statement does not satisfy
the active participation requirement so as to render such participants in privity with a pur-
chaser. Even substantial involvement in the preparation of registration and offering materi-
als will not create liability unless there is also active involvement in the negotiations leading
to the sale in question....
57 See Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1989) (attorney);
Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (appraisers and accountants).
58 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647. In the words of Mr. Justice Blackmun in his Pinter opinion, Section
12(1) "contemplates a buyer-seller relationship not unlike traditional contractual privity." True, its
scope is not "limited to persons who pass title." Since "solicitation is the stage at which an investor
is most likely to be injured," a Section 12(1) seller must include the person "who successfully solicits
the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the
security owner." Id at 645-47. See also Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1988); Harelson v.
Miller Fin. Corp., 854 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1988).
59 See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 324-25.
60 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Ackerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1987); Stokes v.
Lokken, 664 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Gas Reclamation Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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aiding and abetting claims cannot be maintained under section [12(1)
and] 12(2)."62
There is a recent trend whereby lower courts have held that the sec-
tion 12(2) remedy is limited to investors purchasing in initial public offer-
ings, and is not available to investors purchasing in the secondary trading
markets. 63 Courts so holding rationalize that the legislative history of the
1933 Act is relatively clear that "the Act was designed to 'affect [] only
new offerings of securities ... [and] does not affect the ordinary redistri-
bution of securities unless such redistribution takes on the characteristics
of a new offering .... ,' -4 Other courts reject this approach, 65 relying on
the fact that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Naftalin,66 held that
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act-the anti-fraud provision applicable to SEC
civil injuntive actions and criminal prosecutions-applies to secondary
market transfers, as well as initial public offerings. 67
Section 12(1) imposes virtual strict liability upon the seller of securi-
ties who violates section 5.68 A plaintiff under section 12(2), however,
must plead with sufficient particularity and prove that defendant knew or
should have known about the misstatements or omissions. 69 A defend-
ant in a section 12(2) case may escape liability by demonstrating reason-
able inquiries into possible fraud by the issuer or other seller or that the
exercise of reasonable care would not have discovered any wrongdoing-
930 (1978); In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lorber v. Beebe, 407
F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
62 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 354 & n.30 (citing Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294-
95 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting the "doubtful nature" of aiding and abetting liability in a Section 12
action); In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumers Prod. Bus. Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 475-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Harrison v. Eventure Capital Group, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 473 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Am-
bling v. Blackstone Cattle Co., 658 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (N.D. I1. 1987); Frymire v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 657 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Parquitex Partners v. Registered Fin. Planning
Serv., Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,255 (D. Or. 1987); Benvoy v.
Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1984). See also
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (bank).
63 See, e.g., Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,437 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1989); First Union
Brokerage v. Milos, 717 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1989); SSH Co. v. Shearson, Lehman Brothers,
Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But see Note, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities
Act to the Afternarket, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 955 (1990) (concluding that § 12(2) should be applied to
aftermarket sales on inefficient markets involving an asymmetry of information).
64 Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1989)(quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933)).
65 See, e.g., Elysian Fed. Say. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737 (D.NJ.
1989).
66 441 U.S. 768, 777 (1979).
67 713 F. Supp. at 750, n.17.
68 However, the Supreme Court did hold that the in pari delicto (equal fault) defense is available
to a § 12(1) defendant if the plaintiff is at least equally responsible for actions that render the sale of
unregistered securities illegal, and the plaintiff's role in the offering or sale of unregistered securities
is more as a promoter than investor. Such a determination is dependent on the facts of the particu-
lar case. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 635-39 (1988). Cf. Berner v. Lazzaro, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
69 See, e.g., Roebuck v. Guttman, 678 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Farlow v. Peat Marwick Mitch-
ell & Co., 666 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D. Okla. 1987); Bozsi Ltd. Partnership v. Lynott, 676 F. Supp. 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Center Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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i.e., by establishing, in effect, a "reasonable care" or a "due care"
defense. 70
Once a material omission or misrepresentation is proven, reliance is
presumed in a section 12(2) case. 71
A plaintiff who still owns the securities in question in a section 12(1)
or section 12(2) case is entitled to rescission of the sale with return of the
consideration given, plus interest, upon tender of the securities.7 2 A
plaintiff who no longer owns the securities is entitled to damages equal
to the purchase price of the securities minus the sale price. 73 Under sec-
tion 11 (e), costs and attorneys' fees can be directed by the court upon a
finding that the suit or defense was "without merit. ' 74 There is no ex-
press attorneys' fee provision in section 12.
70 Section 12(2) states, in part, that the seller will be liable if the seller "shall not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission." See supra note 48. The "reasonable care" or "due care" defense
under § 12(2) differs to some degree from the "due diligence" defense under § 11. For example,
the "expertising" defense of § 11 is not available under § 12(2). See, e.g., R.JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
The 'Due Diligence' Defense Under Section 11; The 'Due Care' Defense Under Section 12(2), in SECURrnIES
REGULATION 931-36, particularly at 934 (6th ed. 1987). There is a fair amount of uncertainty in this
area as a result of the Supreme Court's vacation and remand of the Seventh Circuit opinion in Sand-
ers v.John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 929 (1976).
The Supreme Court remanded Sanders to be considered in light of its then recent rule lOb-5 opinion
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). After a new Seventh Circuit opinion on re-
mand, Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented from a denial of certiorari. See Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981). Professor Hazen
comments:
The imposition of a 'reasonable care' standard [under § 12(2)] is different language than
the 'due diligence' rubric of § 11. It is clear that § 12(2)'s requirement of 'reasonable care'
imparts some sort of negligence standard and that it is not necessary for the purchaser to
show any type of scienter on the seller's part. Although there is not a per se affirmative
investigation requirement, it has been held that the § 12(2) standard of reasonable care may
impose a duty to investigate depending on the circumstances. Reasonable care imparts a
sliding scale of standard of conduct and has been held to impose a duty of continuing investi-
gation in the case of the exclusive dealer of the security in question. On the other hand, two
justices of the Supreme Court have taken the position that any imposition of an affirmative
investigation requirement is a misapplication of the 'reasonable care' standard since the
investigation language of § 11 is said to call for a greater undertaking than the 'care' re-
quirement of § 12(2).
1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 315-16 (citingJustices Powell and Rehnquist dissenting from denial of
certiorari in Sanders) (footnotes omitted). See also Davis v. Arco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th
Cir. 1984); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (seller-attorney could not show that he
would not have discovered material omission with reasonable care); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, 609 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir. 1979); Franklin Say. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977).
71 See, e.g., Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780 (1lth Cir. 1988); Austin v. Loft-
sgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 177 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Conner Bonds Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,969 (E.D.N.C. 1988); Acme Propane Inc. v. Tenecco Inc., 666 F. Supp.
143 (N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. I11. 1985).
72 See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 655 (1986); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, 609 F.2d 1028,
1034-35 (2d Cir. 1979); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainer-
ight & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604, 607 (D. Mass. 1984); Mott v. Tri-Continental Fin. Corp., 330 F.2d 468
(2d Cir. 1964); Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1961).
73 See e.g., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 697 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 607 F. Supp. 1312
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Punitive damages are not recoverable under § 12); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources
Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 748 (N.D. 111. 1981) (Tax benefits received by plaintiff as a result of his
securities purchase, need not be deducted from his damages).
74 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988). See, eg., Stem v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp., 844 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1988); Aid Auto Stores v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1975); Zissu v. Bear, Stems & Co., 627 F.
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Like all other 1933 Act private party suits, there is concurrent juris-
diction in both state and federal courts for private civil damages or re-
scission actions pursuant to section 12(1) and section 12(2). 7 5
C. Rule 10b-5 Under the 1934 Act 76
Rule 10b-5 under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 77 is a general anti-
fraud and anti-manipulative provision which creates an implied right of
action in favor of anyone injured as a result of fraudulent activity in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security.78 The elastic scope of rule
1 Ob-5 enables it to be employed in a broad range of cases where sections
11 and 12 of the 1933 Act do not apply.
Unlike sections 11 and 12, rule lOb-5 places no limitations on the
permissible class of defendants in a case brought under the rule. Any
person, including both controlling persons 79 and aiders and abettors8 °
may be held liable under rule lOb-5. Liability attaches to perpetrators
Supp 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Rubin v. Long Island Lighting Co., 576 F. Supp. 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1986);
LeMaster v. Bull, 581 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
75 See Hazen, Allocation ofJurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for Remedies Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 60 N.C.L. REv. 707 (1982). However, § 12 suits initiated in state court are not remov-
able to federal court. See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 221 & n.6 (citing Knapp v. Gomez, [1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 933,287 (S. D. Cal. 1987) (§ 17(a) claim is not
removable).
76 See, e.g., A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD (1982);
5, 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D A. JACOBS, LrrIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 (2d ed. 1990); Brooks,
Rule 10b-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403
(1980); Ferrara and Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA.
L. REv. 263 (1980); Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule IOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093 (1977);
Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule l Ob-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964); Milich, Securities Fraud
Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 11 J. CORP. L. 179 (1986); Nahler, Implied Rights of Action and the
Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717 (1980); Phillips, An Essay:
The Competing Currents of Rule l0b-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REv. 625 (1988); Ruder, Civil Liability
Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Ruder & Aldare,
'Neither Unusual Nor Unfortunate;' The Overlap of Rule lob-5 With the Express Liability Section of the Securities
Acts, 60 TEx. L. REv. 719 (1982); Walker, Accountants' Liability-The Scienter Standard Under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 MARo. L. REv. 243 (1979); Note, Reliance
Under Rule 10b-5: Is the 'Reasonable Investor' Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1972); Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975); Note, SEC
Rule l0b-5: Constructive Fraud and the Liabilities of Fiduciaries, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 934 (1974); Note, The
Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974);
Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REv. 537 (1956); Note, Rule lOb-5: The Exclusivity of
Remedies, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement, and Constructive Deception, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 887
(1980).
77 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989). Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
78 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
79 The controlling person provision of the 1934 Act is § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988). Under
§ 20(a), a controlling person of anyone liable under "any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder" is jointly and severally liable to the same extent as such controlled person
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of, or participants in, fraudulent activity "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 8'
1. In Connection With82
Defendants themselves need not have purchased or sold any securi-
ties so long as their fraudulent activity occurred "in connection with" a
purchase or sale by the plaintiff.83 Thus, if a defendant issuer or person
associated with an issuer disseminates false or misleading statements into
the market by press release or otherwise, in a manner reasonably calcu-
lated to affect investors who are buying and selling the issuer's securities
in the open trading markets, the defendant will have rule lOb-5 liability
exposure.84
"unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action." Id
The common law doctrine of respondeat superior provides for liability without fault; it does not
embrace a good faith defense such as those provided by § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20(a) of the 1934
Act-the controlling persons provisions. See, e.g., In re At. Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 30
(Ist Cir. 1986); Note, Rule lOb-5-The Equivalent Scope of Liability Under Respondeat Superior and Section
20(a)-Imposing a Benefit Requirement on Apparent Authority, 55 VAND. L. RPv. 1383 (1982). The major-
ity of courts have held that § 20(a) controlling person liability is not exclusive and may be expanded
by respondeat superior and other common law agency principles. See, e.g., In re Ad. Fin. Manage-
ment, Inc., 784 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1986); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.),
cert deniedsub nom, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d
1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Holloway v. Howerd, 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976); Carras v. Burns, 516
F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975); Krebs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974). How-
ever, the Third Circuit has held that § 20(a) may not be circumvented by agency or respondeat
superior principles. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
Nevertheless, the only en banc holding to date affirmed the majority rule. In Hollinger v. Titan
Capital Corp., 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17054, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,500 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior precedent as espoused in Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521
F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), and now follows the majority rule allowing
respondeat superior to be used to circumvent § 20(a)'s controlling persons provision.
80 Courts apply a three-prong test for aiding and abetting in rule lOb-5 claims. A plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) a securities law violation by the primary party; (2) knowledge of the violation by the
aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the primary violation.
See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman &
Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981); IIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp.,
602 F.2d 478,483 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon
& Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139,
162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). For an important "aiding and abetting"
decision focusing on what degree of scienter must be proven to hold lawyers and accountants liable
for aiding and abetting federal securities violations of an issuer, see Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). For an excellent in-depth recent study of aiding and
abetting in securities cases, see Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical
Examination, 52 AL. L. REv. 637 (1988).
81 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
82 See 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 108-10; see also Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
83 See, e.g., In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
84 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1969), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971); Ritter v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 371 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1967); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F.
Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). See
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The "in connection with" language requires a not insignificant
nexus between the defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's purchase or
sale of securities.8 5 It is true that rule lOb-5 is not limited solely to fraud
relating to the merits or value of the securities purchased or sold. It can
relate to a general course of dealing in securities transactions.86 But rule
lOb-5 does not reach, for example, the tortious conversion or outright
theft of securities.8 7 Nevertheless, rule lOb-5's broad "in connection
with" language has an elastic nature that stretches the coverage of the
rule far beyond the scope of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act. For
example, section 11 applies only to registered public offerings, not to
after-market trading. Some courts have so limited section 12, holding
that section 12(2) cannot apply to after-market trading. However, rule
lOb-5 is not so limited. It applies to both registered public offerings (in-
cluding initial public offerings) as well as to after-market trading.88
2. Standing to Sue: Purchaser-Seller Requirement8 9
In 1975, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,90 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the rule laid down by the Second Circuit in 1952 in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. ,91 that an implied private damages remedy
is available under rule lOb-5 only to purchasers or sellers of securities in
the transaction in question. Failure to plead compliance with the pur-
chaser/seller standing requirement will result in dismissal of a rule lOb-5
private damages claim.92
The Blue Chip decision clearly bars a mere holder of securities from
pursuing a rule lOb-5 damages claim for the alleged diminution of the
also Allen, The Disclosure Obligation of Publicly Held Corporations in the Absence of Insider Trading, 25 MER-
CER L. REV. 479 (1974); Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO.
LJ. 935 (1979); Fleisher, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1294-95 (1965); Fleischer & Mundheim, Initial Inquiry
into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973). Cf. Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (Supreme Court condones "fraud on the market" theory of rule lOb-
5 liability.).
85 See In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1986); Head v.
Head, 759 F.2d 1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1985); cf. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon & Co., 629 F. Supp. 427,442 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Klausner v. Ferro, 604 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986).
86 See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986);
Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985).
87 See Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986); John v. Blackstock, 664 F. Supp. 1426 (M.D.
Fla. 1987); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Smith v. Chicago
Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
88 Compare, Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), with SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc).
89 See Froelich & Spiegel, Standing of Federal Securities Plaintiffs-Which Way the Trend?, 24 DE PAUL
L. REV. 510 (1975); Schneider, Derivative Suit and Blue Chip Standing, 12 CONN. L. REV. 465 (1980);
Note, Standing Under Rule lob-5 after Blue Chip, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 413 (1976).
90 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
91 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See also Boone & McGowan, Standing
to Sue Under S.E.C. Rule lob-5, 49 TEx. L. REV. 617 (1971); Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: 'Tolls the Knell of the Parting Day?', 25 U. MiAMI L. REV. 131 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lob-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Ruder, Standing to Sue Under
Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1971); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctriue: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV.
543 (1971).
92 See, e.g., International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
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securities' value, allegedly caused by defendant's rule lOb-5 violation.
However, whether there exist exceptions to the Blue Chip purchaser/
seller standing rule that would allow "forced" sellers, "aborted" sellers,
"frustrated" sellers, or "would be" sellers, to pursue rule lOb-5 damage
claims, or whether a nonselling shareholder can bring a rule lOb-5 in-
junctive claim for a defendant's market manipulative conduct, remain un-
settled areas of rule lOb-5 law.93 So too remains unsettled the question
whether a purchaser or seller of an option can pursue a rule lOb-5 claim
based upon fraud involving the underlying security.94
3. Scienter9 5
Proof of scienter, i.e., actual or constructive guilty knowledge, on the
part of the defendant, is a necessary element of a rule lOb-5 cause of
action. The Supreme Court squarely held so in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, rejecting all claims that negligence could ever be a sufficient
basis to support a rule lOb-5 action.96 The Supreme Court, however, left
open the question whether recklessness could ever constitute construc-
tive scienter for rule lOb-5 purposes.97 Most circuit courts have since
held that some degree of recklessness-whether highly, gross, or simple,
but in any event more than negligence-will satisfy rule lOb-5's scienter
requirement, at least in cases where defendant owes plaintiff a fiduciary
duty in connection with the securities transaction at issue.98
In Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp. ,99the Ninth Circuit recently re-
viewed en banc the various "recklesness" tests that might accomodate
rule lOb-5 litigation, and adopted the fairly stringent Seventh Circuit test
previously articulated in the Sunstrand 100 case:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but
93 See 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 71-77.
94 See Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Insider Options Traders, 101 HARv. L. REv.
106 (1988); Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors Under SEC Rule lOb-5: A Policy, Doctrina
and Economic Analysis, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1959 (1987); Note, Securities Reguation fr a Changing Market:
Option Trader Standing Under Rule lOb-5, 97 YALE LJ. 623 (1988).
95 See, e.g., Branson, Statutory Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of
Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L. REV. 50 (1977); Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter
Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STA. L. REv. 213 (1977); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of its Impact Upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28
HAsINGs LJ. 569 (1977); Floor, Scienter Requirement Under Rule lOb-5 and Reliance on Advice of Counsel
After Hochfelder and 10b-5, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 191 (1976); Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and
10b-5, 32 Bus. LAw. 147 (1976); Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63
MINN. L. REv. 79 (1978).
96 425 U.S. 185, reh'g. denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). In a subsequent case, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680 (1980), on remand, 666 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1981), the Supreme Court held that in fraud cases brought
under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, that is, SEC civil injunctive actions, proof of scienter is required
under subsection 17(a)(1), but that negligence would be sufficient to support SEC claims for injunc-
tive relief pursuant to subsections 17(a)(2) and (3).
97 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 690-91.
98 See generally 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 82-85; Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting
Securities FraudA Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REv. 637 (1988); Note, Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting
Violations of Rule lOb-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1087 (1984).
99 1990 WL 139583 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
100 Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977).
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an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known
to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware
of it. 10 1
In adopting this stringent "recklessness test," the Ninth Circuit over-
ruled the "flexible duty" rule lOb-5 test that has been applied in the
Ninth Circuit for over fifteen years.' 0 2 The en banc Hollinger court ac-
knowledged that the "flexible duty" test allowed for negligence liability
in some circumstances in rule lOb-5 cases, thereby violating the Supreme
Court's proscription in Hochfelder that mere negligence could never sup-
port a rule 10b-5 violation.' 03 The Hollinger court rejected the request
of amicus curiae SEC that the Ninth Circuit adopt as the correct "reck-
lessness" test the common law fraud standard of "conscious
indifference."' 0 4
4. Reliance' 0 5
A plaintiff must rely on defendant's fraudulent conduct; a rule lOb-5
private damages cause of action will not be available to a plaintiff who
was fully aware of the false, misleading or deceptive nature of defend-
ant's conduct. Reliance, however, is difficult to demonstrate in nondis-
closure situations. Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that there is a
presumption of reliance in nondisclosure or "omissions" cases; i.e., the
requisite reliance may be inferred from the demonstrated materiality of
the omission. 106
Since the Affiliated Ute Supreme Court decision in 1971, there has
been an important issue in federal securities jurisprudence as to whether
reliance can be indirect rather than direct; that is, will it be sufficient that
plaintiff relied on the efficacy of the price in the open market when he
bought his security, even if plaintiff was unaware that the price was af-
fected by defendant's material misrepresentation or omission? 0 7 This
a
101 Id. at 1044-45 quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D.
Okla. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980)).
102 Hollinger, 1990 WL 139583, *4 nn.9-10 and accompanying text. See also, Kidwell ex rel. Pen-
fold v. Meike, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979); Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank v. Control Metals
Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 636 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1975); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974)
103 Hollinger, 1990 WL 139583, *4 nn.9-10 and accompanying text. Seealso, Spectrum Fin. Cos. v.
Marconsult Inc., 608 F.2d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion of Judge Ferguson), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
104 Hollinger 1990 WL 139583, *4 n.7. See also Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5: Scienter, Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, I1 J. CORP. L. 179, 191-99 (1986) (reviewing
formulations of recklessness by various courts); Note, A Complicity-Doctrine Approach to Section 10(b)
Aiding and Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 180, 184-86 (1989).
105 See R.JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1274-87 (6th ed.
1987); Stoll, Reliance as an Element in lOb-5 Actions, 53 OR. L. REV. 169 (1974); Whalen, Causation and
Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 13 PAc. LJ. 1003 (1982); Note, Reliance Requirement in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 38 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975); Comment, Reliance Under Rule lob-
5: Is the 'Reasonable Investor' Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972).
106 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, reh'g denied, 407 U.S. 916 (1972).
107 See, e.g., Lipton v. Documentation Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 740 F.2d 979
(lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb Okla.
Irrigation Fuel Authority, 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Panzirer
v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d
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so-called "fraud on the market" theory of rule lOb-5 liability was recently
approved by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.108 The theory
assumes that an efficient market's valuation of a security reflects all infor-
mation available to the public; therefore, a purchaser's reliance on the
market's valuation is equivalent to reliance on the underlying fraudulent
activity that affects the market price. 10 9
5. Materiality 1 °
To successfully pursue a rule lOb-5 claim, a plaintiff must prove that
defendant's misstatement, omission, or other fraudulent or deceptive
conduct was "material." The Supreme Court, in 1976, in a rule 14a-9
proxy case-TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. -held that "the issue of
materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, in-
volving as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set of
facts.""'
In setting the legal standard of materiality in the proxy fraud con-
text, the Northway Court held that "an omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it im-
portant in deciding how to vote."' "12 This test requires
a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliber-
ations of a reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the "to-
tal mix" of information made available."1
Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable inves-
tor as having altered the 'total mix' of information made available.
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court adopted the Northway
materiality test for rule lOb-5 cases. 1 4 Nevertheless, materiality issues
462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.
1979); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See also
Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market
Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 435 (1984); Grzebielski, Should the Supreme Court Recognize General Market
Reliance in Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5?, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 335 (1984); Heisel, Panzirer v. Wof An
Extension of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory of Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 695 (1983);
Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule lob-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
627 (1982); Note, Fraud on the Market Theory, 95 HAv. L. REv. 1143 (1982).
108 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
109 Id.
110 See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 86-93;JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1241-57 (6th ed. 1987). See also Herzel & Hagan, Materiality and the Use of SEC Forms, 32
Bus. LAw. 1177 (1977); Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAw. 887
(1977); Ratner, Recent DevelOments in Litigation Under the Anti-Fraud Provisions: Materiality, Reliance and
Causation, and Corporate Mismanagement, 10 INST. ON SEC. REG. 445 (1979); Survey: Report ofthe Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Symposium), 26 UCLA L. REv.
48 (1978).
111 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
112 Id. at 439.
113 Id.
114 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Basic Court also specifically adopted the Second Circuit's Texas Gulf
Sulphur approach for determining and applying rule 1Ob-5's materiality requirement to contingent or
speculative information or events: "Under such circumstances, materiality 'will depend at any given
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pervade litigation under rule lOb-5 and related federal securities law
anti-fraud proscriptions.' 1 5
6. Causation 116
A plaintiff in a rule lOb-5 damages action must prove "causation"-
i.e., that there exists a sufficient causal connection between his injury and
defendant's unlawful conduct that violates rule lOb-5. Causation in tort
law ordinarily embraces both causation in fact, and legal cause which is
sometimes framed in terms of "foreseeability" or "proximate cause." 117
In rule lOb-5 cases, courts require proof of both "transaction causation"
and "loss causation."118 Transaction causation is "but for" causation
that is akin to reliance; i.e., the transaction would not have occurred "but
for" the illegal conduct, or that the terms of the transaction that would
have occurred in any event, were influenced by the material misrepresen-
tation or omission. 19 Loss causation requires that plaintiff's injury (i.e.,
his loss of money, or diminution of value of his security) is directly attrib-
utable to defendant's wrongful conduct.1 20 Sometimes courts lump both
aspects of the required causation-i.e., "transaction" and "loss"-under
time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.' " Id at 238 (quoting SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
115 See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (issues concerning "qualita-
tive" materiality and integrity theories of materiality); Branch & Rubright, Integrity of Management
Disclosures Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 1447 (1982); Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg,
Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555 (1981);
Fedders, Speech, Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2057 (Nov. 26,
1982).
116 See, e.g., 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 100-10 ("10b-5 Causation"); Crane, An Analysis of
Causation Under Rule lOb-5, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 98 (1981); Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in
Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1988); Whalen, Causation
and Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 13 PAC. L.J. 1003 (1982).
117 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See also Bastian v.
Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990) (failure to establish that defendant's wrongdo-
ing was proximate cause of plaintiff's injury); Sperber v. Boesky, 672 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988) (failure to establish requisite proximate cause), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 2590 (1990); First Interstate Bank v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1988) (failure to
establish proximate cause).
118 Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2590 (1990);
Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1988), vacated sub nom. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1121 (1989). Cf.
Rankow v. First Chicago Corp., 870 F.2d 356, 367 (7th Cir. 1989); Rousseffv. E. F. Hutton Co., 867
F.2d 1281 (11 th Cir. 1989); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (rule 14(a)(9) proxy case); Hartman v. Blinder, 687 F. Supp.
938 (D.NJ. 1987).
119 See, e.g., Rankow v. First Chicago Corp., 870 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1989) (market fluctuations are
intervening cause between defendant's misconduct and plaintiff's loss, but not every intervening
cause will defeat plaintiff's necessary showing of loss causation); Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C.,
844 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872
F.2d 1124 (1989); Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1233 (7th Cir. 1988); Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Merritt, A Consistent Model of
Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1988).
120 See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2590 (1990); Rankow v. First Chicago Corp., 870 F.2d 356, 367 (7th Cir. 1989); Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Rafton v. Baptist Park
Nursing Center, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D. Ariz. 1985); Merritt, A Consistent Model ofLoss Causa-
tion in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1988).
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the more traditional common law label of "proximate cause." For exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit in the Huddleston case stated:
The plaintiff must prove not only that, had he known the truth, he
would not have acted, but in addition ihat the untruth was in some
reasonably direct, or proximate, way responsible for his loss. The cau-
sation requirement is satisfied in a rule lOb-5 case only if the misrepre-
sentation touches upon the reasons for the investment's decline in
value. If the investment decision is induced by misstatements or omis-
sions that are material and that were relied upon by the claimant, but
are not the proximate reason for his pecuniary loss, recovery under
the rule is not permitted. 121
7. Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Internal Corporate Mismanagement-A
"Deception" Requirement1 22
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit "manipulation" or "decep-
tion" in connection with securities purchases and sales, and are com-
monly understood to proscribe securities fraud. After the Supreme
Court's 1971 decision in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casu-
alty Co.,123 many courts, as well as legal commentators, believed that
mere corporate mismanagement, at least if it constituted a corporate offi-
cial's breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders, suf-
ficiently constituted "fraud" for the purposes of triggering a rule lOb-5
damages cause of action.1 24
But in 1977, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,125 the Supreme Court
slammed the door on the possibility of pursuing corporate mismanage-
ment/breach of fiduciary duty cases through the guise of rule 10b-5
121 Huddleston v. Herman & McLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). See also Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2590 (1990); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988). For an excellent up-
to-date analysis of the complexities of the "causation" requirement in rule lOb-5 private damage
actions, see 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 100-07.
122 See Block & Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Santa Fe v.
Green, 2 CORP. L. REv. 91 (1979); Campbell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc., v. Green: An Analysis Two Years
Later, 30 ME. L. REv. 187 (1979); Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980); Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets:
Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 391; Hazen,
Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Acts'Antifraud Provisions: A Familiar Path With Some New
Detours, 20 B.C.L. Rv. 819 (1979); Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects lOb-5's Proscriptions Against Corporate
Mismanagement, 6 SEC. REG. Lj. 3 (1978); Jacobs, Rule 10b-5 and Self-Dealing by Corporate Fiduciaries: An
Analysis, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 643 (1979); Sherrard, FederalJndicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 695 (1978); Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of the
Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate Mismanagement, 31 Bus. LAw. (Special Issue, Feb. 1976);
Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duties Under Rule lOb-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HAv.
L. REv. 1874 (1978).
123 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
124 See, e.g., Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977); Dyer, Essay on Federal-
ism in Private Actions Under Rule lob-5, 1976 UTAH L. REv.; Jacobs, Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule
lOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. Q. 27 (1973); Jennings, Federalization of
Corporation Law: Part Way orAll the Way?, 31 Bus. LAw. 991 (1976); Roantree, Continuing Development of
Rule 10b-5 as a Means of Enforcing the Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 35 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 201 (1972); Sherrard, Fiduciaries and Fairness Under Rule lob-5, 29 V~AD. L. REv. 1385 (1976);
Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAsv. L. REv.
1007 (173).
125 430 U.S. 462 (1977), on remand, 562 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1977).
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fraud. Unless a plaintiff can show "deception," the Santa Fe court held
that a breach of fiduciary duty did not violate rule lOb-5. Even though a
short form "squeeze out" merger with no valid corporate purpose
caused the plaintiff minority shareholders in Santa Fe to receive a low
cash-out price for their shares, there was no rule lOb-5 violation because
the parent corporation had complied fully with applicable Delaware state
law and had made all the disclosures that state law mandated. Since
there was full disclosure, there was no "deception," and, afortiori, no rule
lOb-5 violation. Although Professor Hazen cites five post-Santa Fe court
of appeals decisions reading the Supreme Court's Santa Fe opinion nar-
rowly, and continuing to expansively construe the reach of rule lOb-5,12 6
he concludes, nevertheless, that it remains clear that a claim that states
merely a breach of fiduciary duty will not be sufficient under rule lOb-
5.127
Mr. Justice White emphasized for the majority in Santa Fe, that the
Court chose not to federalize all corporate breach of fiduciary duty cases
by converting them into rule lOb-5 "fraud" cases: "Absent a clear indi-
cation of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substan-
tial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in
securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regu-
lation would be overridden."1 28
The "deception" requirement of rule lOb-5 fraud was indirectly re-
inforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Schreiber v. Burlington North-
ern, Inc. 129 Schreiber was a section 14(e) tender offer anti-fraud case,130 in
which the Supreme Court held that fully disclosed, allegedly "manipula-
tive" conduct does not violate section 14(e) because the conduct is not
"deceptive." Section 14(e), like rule lOb-5, prohibits "fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative acts." As Professor Hazen observes: "The
Schreiber decision reinforces the fact that attempting to characterize a
breach of fiduciary duty as manipulative will not elevate it to a rule lOb-5
violation absent the type of deception required in the Santa Fe Industries
case."131
126 See 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 167-71 (citing Healy v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., 616 F.2d 641
(3d Cir. 1980)); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual
Casualty Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 610
F.2d 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
127 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 171.
128 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
129 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
130 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
131 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 172.
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8. Damages 132
Punitive damages are not recoverable in a rule IOb-5 implied private
damages cause of action.' 33 Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act expressly lim-
its damages to "actual damages on account of the act complained of."' 3 4
However, punitive damages may be recoverable in a pendent state com-
mon law fraud claim that is adjudicated as a part of the rule 10b-5
case.' 3 5 Plaintiff must both affirmatively plead, and prove actual damages
in a rule lOb-5 case; otherwise, the case will be dismissed.'3 6 The case
law is unclear on precisely what the appropriate measure of damages
should be, i.e., "out-of-pocket," "benefit of the bargain," "rescission,"
or "disgorgement."'13 7 Particularly in insider-trading cases, appropriate
measurement of damages can be the most difficult aspect of a rule lOb-5
case.' 38 The issues of whether plaintiff's damages in a rule lOb-5 case
may be increased by plaintiff's anticipated but unrealized tax benefits, or
must be reduced by the amount of plaintiff's favorable tax benefits al-
ready recognized as a result of the contested securities transactions, are
unresolved.' 3 9
132 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. Cms. L. REv. 611 (1985);
Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093 (1977); Mullaney, Theories of
Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 277
(1977); Reder, Measuring Buyers'Damages in 10b-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839 (1976); Sacher, Overview of
the Panoply of Remedies Available to Aggrieved Plaintiff Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 7 CUMB. L. REv. 429 (1977);
Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND.
L. REv. 349 (1984); Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule lOb-5, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 733 (1971); Note,
Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371 (1974);
Comment, A Role for the lob-5 Private Action, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 460 (1981); Comment, Insiders'
Liability Under Rule lOb-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Securities, 78 YALE LJ. 864 (1969).
133 See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987); Petrites v.J.'C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1981); de Haas
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under the Federal
Securities Acts, 47 NoTRE DAME LAw. 72 (1971).
134 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).
135 See, e.g., Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057
(1986); Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 756 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Meyers v.
Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982); Petrites v.J. C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1981); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972); Comment, Reappearance of Punitive Damages
in Private Actions for Securities Fraud, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 111 (1973).
136 See Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 834 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
137 See cases and articles cited in 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 110-19.
138 Id. at 116-18. See also Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
139 Compare Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982) with Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded 478
U.S. 1015 (1986); also compare Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated,
478 U.S. 1015 (1986), with Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984).
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9. Costs and Attorneys' Fees 140
Unlike section 11(e) of the 1933 Act,14 1 the 1934 Act contains no
express provision mandating the award of costs or attorneys' fees in friv-
olous litigation or otherwise. Therefore, in rule lOb-5 cases, general fed-
eral law governs. "Costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party unless
the court directs otherwise .... ,"142 But the "American rule" dictates
that attorneys' fees are not generally recoverable in the absence of ex-
press statutory authority. 143
10. Statute of Limitations
There is no express statute of limitations governing the implied rule
lOb-5 private damage cause of action.' 44 And the courts have not devel-
oped any uniform federal rule to resolve the statute of limitations issue in
rule 1 Ob-5 cases. There appear to be at least five alternatives: (i) apply by
analogy the express limitations periods governing claims under sections
9, 16, 18, or 29(b), of the 1934 Act;' 45 (ii) apply by analogy the express
limitations period governing the newly created insider-trading cause of
action contained in section 20A of the 1934 Act; 146 (iii) apply by analogy
section 13 of the 1933 Act which expressly governs private remedies
under sections I I and 12 of that Act; 147 (iv) apply by analogy the forum
state's common law fraud limitations period;148 or (v) apply by analogy
the forum state's blue sky securities fraud limitations period. 149
The recent, but not yet uniform, trend is to apply the analogous ex-
press 1934 Act limitations periods applicable to sections 9, 16, 18, and
29(b) of that Act, thereby providing a one-year/three-year limitations pe-
riod for rule lOb-5 actions. The Third Circuit began this approach in In
140 See 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 119-24.
141 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
142 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). See also In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286, 1302
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
143 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). Of course, in rule
1Ob-5 class or derivative actions, attorneys' fees may be awarded by the court out of the fund plain-
tiffs eventually recover. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Swanson v. Ameri-
can Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975).
144 See In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc); See also Report of
the ABA Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAw. 645 (1986); Bateman &
Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5: Complexity in Need of Re-
form, 39 Mo. L. REV. 165 (1974); Einhorn & Feldman, Choosing a Statute of Limitations in Federal Securi-
ties Actions, 25 MERCER L. REV. 497 (1974); Fiebach & Doret, Quarter Century Later-The Period of
Limitations for Rule lOb-5 Damage Actions in Federal Courts Sitting in Pennsylvania, 25 ViLL. L. REV. 851
(1980); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1125; Schulman,
Statutes of Limitation in 1Ob-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967);
Note, Statutes of Limitation for Rule lOb-5, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1021 (1982).
145 Section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988) (one year from discovery, but no longer than three
years after the violation); § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) (two years from realization of illegal
short-swing profit); § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (one year from discovery, but no longer than
three years after the violation); § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(b) (1988) (one year from discovery, but no
longer than three years after the violation).
146 Section 20A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4) (1988) (five years).
147 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (one year after discovery, but no longer than three years after sale).
148 See, e.g., Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1988). See also cases cited at 2 T.
HAZEN, supra note 1, at 128 n.9.
149 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 128-29 n.10. See also Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d
411 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation.150 The Data Access court, in for-
mulating this approach, relied upon the Supreme Court's adoption of a
uniform federal four-year statute of limitations for all civil RICO claims
in Agency Holding Corporation v. Malley-Duff & Associates. 151 The Supreme
Court in October 1990 granted certiorari in Lampf Pleva Lipkind Prupis &
Petrigrow v. Gilbertson152 to finally determine the question of what statute
of limitations is appropriate for implied private damage causes of action
under rule lOb-5.
11. Insider-Trading: The Misappropriation Theory153
As a result of the Wall Street scandals of the 1980s,154 many rule
lOb-5 private damage claims now involve illegal insider-trading allega-
tions. 155 Newly-amended section 20A of the 1934 'Act provides an ex-
press damages cause of action to contemporaneous traders against illegal
insider-traders.' 56 However, the damages limitations and the defenses of
this new provision will likely cause private plaintiffs to continue to pursue
an implied rule lOb-5 damage cause of action in insider-trading cases. 157
An important issue remains to be resolved in the application of rule lOb-
5 to insider-trading cases: Does the so-called "misappropriation" theory
of insider-trading constitute a rule lOb-5 fraud?
150 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
151 483 U.S. 143 (1987). For a listing of cases following the Data Access rule, as well as cases
specifically rejecting it, see T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 131-32 n.25.
For a discussion of whether state or federal "equitable tolling" principles may extend the other-
wise applicable rule 1Ob-5 statute of limitations, see id. at 134-37 nn.41-60.
152 Reitz v. Leasing Consultants Assocs., 895 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir.) (reported in table) (text in
WESTLAW, AJlfeds library, No. 88-4077), cert. granted sub nom. Lampf Pleva Lipkind Prupis & Pe-
tigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990) (No. 90-333).
153 See, eg., Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIo LJ. 373
(1988); Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HoFSTRA L. REv. 101 (1984); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v.
Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.) aff'd on rehearing en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18175 (2d. Cir.
1990); United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989);
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984);
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Kan. 1990);
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425
(N.D. Ill. 1989); SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d
Cir. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); cf. United States v. Louderman, 576
F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978) (misappropriation in criminal mail fraud
context, 18 U.S.C. § 1341).
154 See, e.g., Outline of Arthur F. Mathews, SEC Criminal Enforcement: From Boesky toJeffries
to Chance-The Criminalization of 'Parking' and Other Novel Securities Law Offenses and the Ad-
ded Threat of RICO Forfeiture, 1 Materials, 17th Annual Securities Regulation Institute, University
of California, San Diego (Jan. 24, 1990).
155 See, e.g., Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
156 See supra note 26.
157 For example, the total recovery of a class of plaintiffs cannot exceed "the profit gained or loss
avoided in the [violative] transaction" by the defendant. § 20A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1 (Supp.
1990). Even that amount must be reduced by any disgorgement the defendant has made in a parallel
SEC insider-trading enforcement action. § 20A(b)(2). However, § 20A(d) preserves a plaintiff's
right to bring an implied private damages cause of action under rule lOb-5, as well as pursue a § 20A
cdaim. See supra note 26.
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Section 20A was specifically intended by the Congress to validate the
misappropriation theory, at least for the purposes of the express remedy
contained therein:
[T]he codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is
specifically intended to overturn court cases which have precluded re-
covery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon
the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1983). The Committee believes that this result is inconsis-
tent with the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act, and that the mis-
appropriation theory fulfills appropriate regulatory objectives in
determining when communicating or trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information is unlawful .... 158
But the Supreme Court has split 4 to 4 on the issue of whether the
misappropriation theory of rule lOb-5 liability is valid.' 59 Until the
Supreme Court resolves this sticky issue, the role of rule lOb-5 in major
private damages class actions based upon allegedly illegal insider-trading
remains in doubt.
12. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all rule lOb-5 dam-
ages cases. Section 27 of the 1934 Act provides that federal courts have
"exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules or regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to en-
force any liability or duty created by this title [1934 Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder."' 160 This differs from 1933 Act private remedies
which may be pursued concurrently in state or federal court. 16 1
There is no doubt that the express private damages or rescission
causes of action provided by sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act are fairly
narrow in scope and that the expansive rule lOb-5 implied private party
damages remedy of the 1960s has been narrowed significantly by the
courts in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, use of civil RICO in
securities litigation is expanding.
III. The Legislative History and Development of RICO as Applied to
Securities Violations
Civil RICO's expansive development 62 may be attributed in part to
the statute's unduly broad and facially clear language, a lack of precise
158 H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1988)(INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988).
159 See United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
160 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). See also Finkielstain v. Seidel, 857 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1988); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Schwartz, 550 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
161 The 1934 Act implied that the rule lOb-5 remedy is cumulative with the express remedies
under the 1933 Act such as §§ 11 and 12. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387
(1983).
162 In order to violate the RICO statute, a person must: (A) use income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; (B)
acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of
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definition for RICO's key elements of pattern 163 and enterprise'6 and
the widespread use of the so-called "commercial fraud" predicate of-
fenses-mail, wire and securities fraud-as the basis for civil RICO
claims. 16 5
A. Legislative History-Securities Fraud Predicate Offense
There is little recorded legislative history on the inclusion of mail
and wire fratid as predicate offenses. However, there is brief mention in
the legislative history on the inclusion of securities fraud in the stat-
ute. 166 The American Bar Association, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and a number of interested federal agencies were then con-
cerned with a growing infiltration of organized crime into the securities
racketeering activity; (C) conduct the affairs of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activity; or (D) conspire to commit (A), (B), or (C). 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (1988). "Racketeering activity" is defined as a violation of any of the acts listed in § 1961(1).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). Such underlying violations are referred to as "predicate acts" or "pred-
icate offenses."
A person seeking redress under RICO must establish injury to "business or property." 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1988). Pecuniary losses attributable to personal injury from a RICO violation are
not recoverable. See, e.g., Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638 (6th Cir. 1986).
163 A "pattern" of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity. 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.
1989) (en banc); Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc). See also Goldsmith,
RICO and Pattern.' The Search For Continuity Plus Relationship, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 971 (1988); Harvey,
The Pattern Requirement in Civil RICO is Working: Case Law After Sedima, 33 VxLL. L. REv. 205 (1988);
Huestis, RICO: The Meaning of "Pattern' Since Sedima, 54 BROOK.YN L. REV. 621 (1988); Note, RICO's
"Pattern" Requirement: Void For Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1990); Note, The Civil RICO Pattern
Requirement: Continuity and Relationship, A Fatal Attraction?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 955 (1988).
164 An enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity and any union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1988). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); Israel, Of Racketeers, RICO, The
Enterprise-Pattern Separateness Issue and Chicken Little: What's Really Falling?, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 564
(1988); Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (Parts I and 1I), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1987),
(Parts III and IV), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1987); Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Re-
sponse to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988); Lynch, Reply to Michael Goldsmith, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 802 (1988); Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646 (1989)
[hereinafter RICO Enterprise]; Note, Innocence by Association: Entities and the Person-Enterprise Rule Under
RICO, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 179 (1988); Note, The RICO Enterprise As Distinct from the Pattern of
RacketeeringActivity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1419 (1988); Comment, The Enterprise
Requirements: Getting to the Heart of Civil RICO, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 663 (1988).
165 See Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 9: "Why does the statute work this way? In part, because it
creates a civil counterpart for criminal wire fraud and mail fraud prosecutions.... Whether it is a
good idea to have a civil counterpart to wire fraud and mail fraud is at least open to question, it
seems to me, quite apart from the question whether treble damages should be awarded." Professor
Abrams, a moderator for a part of this Symposium, noted:
Most private civil RICO cases allege as predicate crimes fraud-type offenses-usually
either mail or securities fraud....
The technical breadth of fraud-type offenses has been used by private RICO plaintiffs
to their advantage. Thus, the reason that it is possible in so many ordinary business dis-
putes to generate a superficially plausible private civil RICO claim is that it is so easy to
make out a case of criminal fraud under applicable federal doctrines.
Looking only to the general offense definitions, the law of criminal fraud seems to
make almost any kind of asserted dishonest behavior in the course of business deal which is
tied to the use of the mails or involves securities a basis for a criminal claim.
Abrams, A New Proposal For Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1989) (footnotes
omitted).
166 For my role in the events that led to the inclusion of securities fraud as a predicate offense, see
Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 99-100 n.130.
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markets.' 6 7 Racketeering activity was being used to manipulate stock
prices-particularly on the American Stock Exchange, and to reap sub-
stantial illegal profits for securities swindlers through securities theft,
counterfeiting, and other illicit practices. t68 The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers Association,
however, issued strong statements in opposition to the inclusion of se-
curities fraud in the proposed statute:
Against the background of expanding securities regulation this defini-
tion could include the various officers, directors and employees of cor-
porations and underwriters of securities who have been found guilty of
fraud in the sale of securities in some of the recent lOb-5 cases. Fraud
in the sale of securities is simply not synonymous with racketeering
activity. ' 69
The groups and agencies that favored inclusion of the commercial fraud
offenses did so at a time prior to the inclusion of the private civil treble
damages remedy, solely because they sought to assist governmental
agencies in effectively pursuing criminal prosecutions and related gov-
ernmental civil enforcement remedies against ongoing criminal organiza-
tions which conduct their activities through illegal means.170
Professor G. Robert Blakey-Notre Dame's eminent RICO
scholar,' 71 and several other academicians have applauded and en-
couraged the use of civil RICO as a substitute federal commercial fraud
statute in securities and corporate matters, as well as in a broad array of
general business litigation.' 72 They have argued, and indeed the courts
167 The Department ofJustice had been opposed to earlier drafts of the bill because it feared that
as a result of the wide range of proposed predicate offenses, the bill was "too broad and would result
in a large number of unintended applications." Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30,
S.974, S.975, S.976, S.1623, S.1624, S.1861, S.2022, S.2122, S.2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. oftheJudiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 404-07 (1969). At that time,
S.1861 did not specifically include the commercial fraud offenses. There is no record as to whether
the addition of mail, wire, and securities fraud quelled or exacerbated the fears of the Department of
Justice.
168 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 99-103 nn.130-33; Glanz, supra note 7, at
1536-39; Bridges, supra note 7, at 59-60 n.103.
169 Hearings on S. 30 and related proposals Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1969) [hereinafter House Hearings]; see also Civil RICO Task Force Report,
supra note 7, at 111-12 nn.155-58.
170 See, e.g., Bridges, supra note 7, at 55 n.83:
Private remedies were added to the bill that became the Organized Crime Control Act
after it had initially passed the Senate. The House Committee on the Judiciary amended
the bill to include the private remedies after holding hearings in response to a proposal by
the American Bar Association.... There was little discussion of the treble damages provi-
sion because of its late introduction-after the completion of the Senate hearings and after
six of eight days of House hearings.
See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 97-103, 247-50; Glanz, supra note 7, at 1522-26;
Bridges, supra note 7, at 58-59.
171 See, e.g., Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology
Center v. Wollersheim; Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 526 (1987); Blakey & Goldstock, On The Waterfront: RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 341 (1980). See also Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and
the Various Proposals For Reform: 'Mother of God - Is This the End of RICO?', 43 VAtiD. L. REV. 851
(1990); Blakey, supra note 6; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 6.
172 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 10; Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 10. See also Getzendanner,
Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act,
43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1990) ("Everyone who has examined the legislative history of RICO,
(Vol. 65:896
RICO IN SECURITIES LITIGATION
have concurred, that RICO was not intended to be limited solely to "or-
ganized crime" in the traditional sense, and that other individuals or
groups engaged in ongoing criminal activity fall within the ambit of the
statute's plain language.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the primary legislative goal of RICO was
the eradication of organized crime from legitimate business and labor
unions.1 73 In addition to enhanced criminal penalties, Congress in-
tended to bring creative, flexible remedies that had been successful in
the antitrust field into the war against organized crime. These included a
potpourri of new civil remedies available to the Department of Justice,
and a private attorney general treble damages cause of action patterned
on the Clayton Act on behalf of persons and entities injured in their busi-
ness or property by patterns of racketeering activity. 174 The legislative
history of the statute demonstrates that Congress intended that the ille-
gal activity that triggers the civil RICO remedy must constitute a criminal
RICO violation. That is, the illegal activity must constitute a pattern of
predicate offenses that embrace the types of criminal activities Congress
envisioned the mob using in order to infiltrate legitimate business
entities.175
B. Overuse of Civil RICO in Securities Cases
However, the use of the civil RICO private attorney general treble
damages provision has been pushed far beyond what Congress actually
envisioned for 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c). In actual practice in the decade
of the 1980s, civil RICO was overused or abused in a floodgate of cases
having nothing to do with driving organized crime out of legitimate busi-
ness. Many of these cases were traditional federal securities cases involv-
ing reputable business defendants. The courts have been relatively
unsuccessful in narrowing civil RICO's scope through judicial construc-
tion, due to the breadth of the plain wording of the statute.1 76 As a con-
with the exception of Professor G. Robert Blakey, has pointed out that Congress added the private
civil treble damages remedy to RICO with virtually no consideration of its purpose or conse-
quences." (footnote omitted)).
173 See, e.g., Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
26 (1983). See also AMENDING THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIzATroNs Aar, S.
REP. No. 269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (April 24, 1990); FIRST, BUSINESS CRIMEs-CAsFS AND MATER-
LALS 87 (1990) ("However broad the language of RICO may sweep, it is dear that Congress was most
concerned with the infiltration of legitimate business by 'organized crime'....").
174 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1985); see also Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Note, "Mother of Mercy, Is This the Beginning of
RICO?'" The Proper Point of Accrual of a Private Civil RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 172, 183-86 (1990)
("The Antitrust Parallel").
175 For a summary of RICO's legislative history, see Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at
70-126.
176 Justice White stated in the majority opinion in Sedima:
It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely
against such [respected and legitimate enterprises], rather than against the archetypal, in-
timidating monster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and
its correction must lie with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private
action in situations where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking
advantage of it in its more difficult applications.... The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil
RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate of-
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sequence, in the 1990s there continue to be too many civil RICO cases
litigated in which reputable businesses and business persons, as well as
their legal, accounting and other professional advisers, who were in-
tended to be the beneficiaries of the statute, are named as defendants
and branded as racketeers.
The ABA Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force reported in 1985 "that
approximately 90 percent of the civil RICO cases in which there has been
a published judicial decision rely upon the use of mail, wire, or securities
fraud as predicate offenses."1 77 Thirty-five percent relied solely or pri-
marily on allegations of securities fraud. 178 The ABA Task Force found
that only nine percent of the civil RICO cases surveyed in its study in-
volved allegations of traditional Mafia-type organized criminal activity. 179
The Supreme Court addressed the growing expansion of civil RICO
through commercial fraud offenses in Sedima, but felt constrained by the
statute's plain language and breadth from affirmatively curtailing overuse
of the statute's civil treble damages remedy. In a dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Marshall agreed with the majority's observations about the extraordi-
nary uses of civil RICO in ordinary commercial cases, but he disagreed
vigorously with the majority's "hands-off" solution.180 Justice Marshall
was particularly concerned with the private litigant's inability to use the
civil RICO statute with caution, in the manner that federal prosecutors
use the statute in criminal prosecutions pursuant to the DOJ Guidelines:
Unlike the Government, private litigants have no reason to avoid dis-
placing state common-law remedies. Quite to the contrary, such liti-
gants, lured by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees,
have a strong incentive to invoke RICO's provisions whenever they
can allege in good faith two instances of mail or wire fraud. 18'
Chief Justice Rehnquist recently echoed this criticism of overuse or
abuse of civil RICO:
Virtually everyone who has addressed the question agrees that civil
RICO is now being used in ways that Congress never intended when it
enacted the statute in 1970. Most of the civil suits filed under the stat-
ute have nothing to do with organized crime. They are garden variety
civil fraud cases of the type traditionally litigated in state courts.' 8 2
fenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Con-
gress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of "pattern."
473 U.S. at 499-500 (footnote omitted).
177 Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 243. Although there has not been a comprehen-
sive survey of civil RICO cases since the publication of the ABA Task Force Report, there is reason
to believe the figures have remained substantially the same.
178 Id. at 57.
179 Id at 56.
180 473 U.S. at 501.
181 473 U.S. at 504. See Bridges, supra note 16, at 50 n.43. See also UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, tit. 9-110.200 (1984); 10 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, tit. 110-200 (Prentice Hall
1988); U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIzATIONS (RICO):
A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1988); Pedowitz & Bookin, Department ofJustice RICO Guidelines
and Their Applicability to Civil Cases, in CIVIL RICO 295 (Hynes ed. P.L.I. 1984); Dennis, Current RICO
Policies of the Department ofJustice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651 (1990).
182 Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 9.
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It is clear that judicial interpretation and legislative inaction have al-
lowed plaintiffs to stretch the confines of civil RICO to apply to "a broad
range of commercial disputes far beyond any matters considered by Con-
gress in enacting the statute."183 The mails and the telephone bring vir-
tually all commercial transactions facially within the scope of the
statute-even though there has never been an express or implied federal
private damages cause of action for mail fraud or wire fraud.
Abuses of civil RICO also result from what the statute does not say.
Nowhere in the language of RICO are the terms "pattern" and "enter-
prise" precisely defined. For a number of years, some courts seemed to
accept as the required "pattern" virtually any two predicate offenses, de-
spite the disparate circumstances of the two offenses and the absence of
on-going criminal behavior.18 4 Other courts accepted as an adequate
"enterprise" the mere sum of the alleged predicate offenses, without any
additional structural or organizational attributes.' 8 5
C. Pattern
The "pattern" element of the statute is ambiguous. In footnote 14
in Sedima, the Court stated:
The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of rack-
eteering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report ex-
plained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The
infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one
'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effec-
tive. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to pro-
duce a pattern." 18 6
The Court pointed out that pattern "embraces criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics and are not isolated events,"' 87 but did nothing in the way of explic-
itly addressing what a pattern is.
The Supreme Court directly considered the question of what consti-
tutes a "pattern" in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 18 There,
the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's unique requirement that a show-
ing be made that the RICO defendant committed acts in furtherance of
183 Id at 244 (citing Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary
Breaches and The Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CraM. L. REv. 117 (1981); and Coffee,
The Metastasis of Mail Fraud- The Continuing Story of the Evolution of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRiM. L.
R~v. 1 (1983)).
184 See, e.g., R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
185 See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152
(2d Cir. 1980).
186 Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (emphasis in original)). See Kaplan, Opinion, 5 RICO L. REP., No. 4, at
491 (1987) ("[w]hile footnote 14 certainly does not rank with the famous footnote in [United States
v.] Carolene Products, it does have a splendid chance of winding up on the list of the top ten
Supreme Court footnotes of all time").
187 Id (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)). Much of what the Sedima court said about "pattern"
had previously been espoused in the Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 193-208.
188 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
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two or more discrete criminal schemes.1 8 9 The Court also invalidated
the approach of the Fifth Circuit, which had required only the commis-
sion of any two related predicate acts. 190
The majority stated that "there is something to a RICO pattern be-
yond simply the number of predicate acts involved."' 191 That something
is that "the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity."' 192 This judicial defini-
tion requiring both relatedness and continuity is somewhat more helpful
than Sedima, 193 but is still very broad. Indeed, despite HJ. Inc., the cir-
cuit courts and district courts are continuing to struggle with the pattern
concept. 194 And the fact that in H.J. Inc. Justice Scalia raised the ques-
tion whether confusion and ambiguity endemic to the pattern concept
makes RICO unconstitutionally vague' 95 suggests that pattern issues will
continue to be at the forefront of both civil and criminal RICO
litigation.' 9 6
D. Enterprise
The "enterprise" element is also ambiguous. Section 1961(4)
broadly states that enterprise includes "any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."' 9 7 However,
section 1961(4) is not a limiting definition.'9 8
In United States v. Turkette,' 9 9 the Court pointed out that there may be
two types of enterprises under the statute-those that are "legal entities"
and those that are "associations in fact." The Court held that wholly
illegitimate organizations or groups of criminals, like an organized crime
189 Id at 2901.
190 Id. at 2899-2900 (invalidating R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985)).
191 Id. at 2900.
192 Id
193 See Weissman, Insight. Don't Believe Everything You Read: H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Does Provide
Meaningful Guidance of RICO's Pattern Issue, 3 INSIDE LITIG. Aug., 1989, at 16.
194 See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines v. Local 639, 883 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also, Fleet Credit
Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1990); Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual of N.
Ohio, Nos. 89-3442, 89-3474 (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S.App. file);
Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc); Jacobson v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717
(2d Cir. 1989); Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989); Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886
F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1989); Combs v. Baker, 886 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1989); Parcoil Corp. v. NOWSCO
Well Service Ltd., 887 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1989); Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1989);
Walk v. B&O Railroad, 847 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1989); Newmyer v. Philateic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d
385 (6th Cir. 1989); Management Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48
(7th Cir. 1989); Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1989); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v.
DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989); Phelps v. The Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262
(10th Cir. 1989).
195 See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2906-09.
196 See, e.g., Blakey, Editorial Analysis, Is "Pattern" Void for Vagueness?, 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No.
28, at 6 (Dec. 12, 1989); Freeman & McSlarrow, RICO and the Due Process "Voidfor Vagueness" Test, 45
Bus. LAw. 1003 (1990); Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REv. 691, 721-32 (1990).
See also United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1990).
197 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
198 "[In Section 1961(4),] Congress defined the enterprise with a non-exclusive term, 'includes.'
A variety of RICO enterprises not listed in the definition may exist." Note, RICO Enterprise, supra
note 163, at 654-55 (footnotes omitted).
199 452 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1981).
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syndicate, a narcotics distribution gang, or an illegal gambling operation,
can constitute an "association in fact" enterprise. 200
The Turkette Court also found that "pattern" and "enterprise" are
separate and distinct elements of a RICO claim, even though each may
be established by common or similar evidence. 20' At the very least,
Turkette stands for the proposition that in some circumstances the gov-
ernment (or a private party plaintiff) may be able to establish the ele-
ments of both pattern and enterprise through the same facts. 20 2
However, different circuit courts have relied on identical language in
Turkette to justify vastly different enterprise tests. 203
E. Suggested Limitations on Pattern and Enterprise
Without substantial limitations to the broad scope of pattern and
enterprise,204 civil RICO will continue to be the darling of the plaintiff's
200 When United States v. Turkette was subjudice before the U. S. Supreme Court, and the law of
the First Circuit was that RICO did not apply to wholly illegitimate enterprises (i.e., the statute ap-
plied only to the infiltration of legitimate businesses or labor unions by racketeers), a Mafia chieftain
and his lieutenant had the following conversation (as actually recorded surreptitiously by the FBI):
Mr. Angiulo: "Our argument is we're illegitimate business."
Mr. Zannino: "We're a shylock."
Mr. Angiulo: "We are a bookmaker. We're selling marijuana. We are illegal here,
illegal there, arsonists. We are everything."
Mr. Zannino: "Pimps."
Mr. Angiulo: "So what?"
Mr. Zannino: "Prostitutes."
Mr. Angiulo: "The law does not cover us, is that right?"
Mr. Zannino: "That's the argument."
Mr. Angiulo: "They can stick RICO ... I wouldn't be in a legitimate business for all
the [expletive] money in the world."
See Doherty, On FBI Tape At Tria4 Angiulo Swears Off'Legitimate Business" Boston Globe, Aug. 24, 1985,
at 17, col. 1; Butterfield,Jury Hears Tape on Gang Wars in Boston Trial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 26,
col. 1; President Ronald Reagan, Declaring Wars on Organized Crime, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986 (Maga-
zine) at 26. See also United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956 (lst Cir. 1988) and 897 F.2d 1169 (1st
Cir. 1990); United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (Ist Cir. 1986).
201 The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering
activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. The [enter-
prise] is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evi-
dence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The [pattern] is proved by
evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in
the enterprise.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 (footnotes and citations omitted).
202 The Court acknowledged that it may be possible in some circumstances for proof of the com-
mission of a pattern of racketeering activity to be sufficient to prove the existence of an enterprise.
"While the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of
one does not necessarily establish the other. The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering
activity;' it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." Turkette,
452 U.S. at 453. See also id at n.5. See generally Note, Of Racketeers, RICO, the Enterprise-Pattern Sepa-
rateness Issue and Chicken Little: What's Really Falling?, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 565, 583 (1988) (discussing
whether Turkette opinion hints at possibility that proof of pattern could equal proof of enterprise); see
also Note, RICO Enterprise, supra note 164, at 707-10.
203 Compare, e.g., the Second Circuit's approach in United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1983) and Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) witb the Eighth Circuit's approach
in United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d
647 (8th Cir. 1982) and the Third Circuit's approach in United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3d
Cir. 1983). See also Note, RICO Enterprise, supra note 164, at 707-13.
204 The definition of "enterprise" offers one opportunity to limit RICO's broad scope. A fre-
quent "enterprise" issue in civil RICO litigation is whether each defendant "participated in the con-
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bar in securities litigation as well as other federal commercial litiga-
tion.20 5 This author has advocated that the pattern requirement should
be limited by requiring proof that the alleged racketeering activity took
place as part of multiple criminal episodes.2 06 The Department ofJustice
duct of the enterprise's affairs." See e.g., Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731
F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1984); cf., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981).
This "participation" element bears on the required "nexus" between "pattern" and the "enter-
prise." See analysis of cases in Mathews & Weissman, Civil RICO Outline, in A. MATHEWS, SnxTH AN-
NUAL RICO LITIGATION UPDATE, at 18, 109-124 (1990).
In its recent en banc decision in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 1990 U.S App.
LEXIS 15347, No. 86-5135 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 1990), the D.C. Circuit held that mere participation in
committing the predicate offenses is not sufficient, and that RICO requires participation in either the
"operation" or "management" of the enterprise. This is a fairly strict test for a plaintiff to estab-
lish-particularly with respect to such "outsiders" as attorneys, accountants and other professional
advisors. The D.C. Circuit specifically rejected the more liberal "participation in the conduct" tests
of the Second Circuit (e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980)), the Fifth Circuit
(e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984)), the
Ninth Circuit (e.g., United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988)), and the Elev-
enth Circuit (e.g., Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Instead, in Yellow Bus, the D.C. Circuit adopted the test previously articulated by the Eighth
Circuit in Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. deniedsub nom. Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983):
Mere participation in the predicate offenses listed in RICO, even in conjunction with a
RICO enterprise, may be insufficient to support a RICO cause of action. A defendant's
participation must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will
require some participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.
Yellow Bus, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15347 at *14 (quoting Bennett, 710 F.2d at 1364) (emphasis in
original).
In Yellow Bus, the D.C. Circuit stressed that "conducting" connotes more than "participating in"
affairs, and that § 1962(c) applies only "when a defendant, through a pattern of racketeering activity,
exercises significant control over or within an enterprise, participating not merely in the enterprise's
affairs, but in the conduct of the enterprises affairs." Yellow Bus at "18, slip op. at 12. The D.C. Court
added: "Most often the participation requirement will be satisfied when a defendant either partici-
pates in directing the enterprise toward its pre-existing goals or participates in exercising control
over an enterprise so as to reset its goals. As the Eighth Circuit observed [in Bennett v. Berg], most of
the time this requirement will only be satisfied when the defendant, either directly or indirectly,
exercises control over the management or operation of the enterprise." Id., slip op. at 12. The D.C.
Circuit noted that "outsiders" as well as "insiders" could be valid defendants under its new rule,
since 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) covers indirect as well as direct participation: "[N]othing in our interpre-
tation of the participation requirement precludes liability on the part of outsiders. The crucial ques-
tion is not whether a person is an insider or an outsider, but whether and to what extent that person
controls the course of the enterprise's business." Id. at "19, slip op. at 12. The Yellow Bus holding
found that a union, committing predicate offenses in picketing a business enterprise during a recog-
nition strike, was not participating in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. See id. at *25-*29, slip
op. at 15-17. See also, Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated, 109
S. Ct. 3235 (1989).
In future federal securities litigation containing civil RICO claims against "outside" profession-
als like attorneys, accountants, and bankers, the Yellow Bus en banc opinion may be the vehicle by
which such "outsiders" find a way to extricate themselves from treble damages exposure by way of
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
205 See, e.g., Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling", 19
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655 (1982); Weissman, Moss Makes RICO Statute the Darling of Plaintiffs' Bar, Legal
Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 24. Cf., Tarlow, supra note 6.
206 See, e.g., Mathews, RICO'sJurisprudential Dilemma: Curtaining Civil RICO Abuse Without Corrupting
the Statute's Primary Goal of Eradicating Racketeering from Legitimate Business, - CATOJ. - (1990); Weiss-
man, Look to the Criminal, Not the Victim, in Devising Standards for RICO's Pattern Requirement, 4 Civ. RICO
Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 3-4 (Jan. 17, 1989); see also, Mathews & Weissman, New Cottage Industry: Inter-
preting RICO's 'Pattern" Requirement, 1 INSIDE LITIG., March, 1987, at 17; Civil RICO Task Force Report,
supra note 7, at 8:
The 'pattern' concept in § 1961(5) should be accorded greater meaning by using it to focus
upon criminal activity of a nature that tends to characterize the perpetrator as a person who
regularly uses crime as a means of achieving his desired ends. At a minimum, this requires
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has already incorporated this requirement in its RICO Guidelines. 207
Likewise, the DOJ has adopted a narrow definition of enterprise which
Congress should incorporate into the statute itself.208 That definition
reads:
No RICO count of an indictment shall charge the enterprise as a
group associated in fact, unless the association in fact had an ascertain-
able structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations
directed toward an economical goal, that has an existence that can be
defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting
the patterns of racketeering activity. 20 9
These more restrictive definitions would add substance to any serious
movement to narrow the reach of civil RICO.
The expansion of RICO into unintended waters can dearly be rec-
ognized when concepts of "pattern" and "enterprise" which appear
sound in a federal criminal prosecution of La Cosa Nostra murders com-
mitted in furtherance of illicit gambling, loan-sharking and narcotics traf-
ficking 210 are later applied in a private securities damage action.
Application of civil RICO to two or three mailings or telephone calls by a
registered representative who fails to state a material fact when selling a
security to a customer/investor (or other comparable conduct), in pur-
suit of a reputable brokerage firm's nationwide securities business is
much more draconian than application of criminal RICO to Cosa Nostra
murderers. 211 However, since civil RICO provides plaintiffs significant
litigation advantages, it is likely that use of the statute will continue to
proliferate in federal securities litigation.
that the pattern of racketeering activity consist of acts that are related to each other through
some common scheme, but which are not simply part of a single criminal episode.
207 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 206-07 (DOJ Guidelines reject view that single
criminal episode is encompassed by RICO). The Department ofJustice has expressed its interest in
"prevent[ing] a pattern of racketeering activity being charged which lacks the attributes which Con-
gress had in mind but which is literally within the language of the statute." CRIMINAL DIV., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNrrED STATES ATroP.NEY's MANUAL § 9-110.341, reprinted in Civil RICO Task Force
Report, supra note 7, at Appendix D.
208 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 8-9:
The "enterprise" concept introduced at § 1961(4) should be given meaning independent of
the pattern of racketeering requirement where associations-in-fact formed to perform crim-
inal acts are alleged. The positions articulated by the Third and Eighth Circuits, as well as
the Guidelines adopted by the Department ofJustice, which requires that an association-in-
fact have a structural continuity distinct from any single set of criminal acts, should be
adopted.
209 Id. at Appendix D, at 14.
210 Cf United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (murder of three members
of Bonanno crime family in one incident in assassination plot directed by "Commission" of La Cosa
Nostra in an effort to realign the leadership of Bonanno crime family, constituted adequate RICO
"pattern"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989). See also United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459
(11 th Cir.) (three predicate offenses of attempted murder arising from a single incident between
defendant motorcyde gang members and police constituted adequate RICO "pattern" since motor-
cycle gang was ongoing criminal enterprise), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 110 (1985).
211 Cf. the cases involving broker-dealers cited supra note 15.
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IV. Plaintiff's Potential Advantages in Pursuing a Federal Securities
Action Under Civil RICO and the Problems RICO Presents
to Such Actions
A private plaintiff possesses numerous potential advantages in pur-
suing a cause of action under civil RICO in a federal securities law case.
However, RICO creates certain problems when applied to securities vio-
lations. This section will analyze the potential advantages to the plaintiff
of pursuing a civil RICO claim in federal securities litigation, and the
major problems which RICO presents to such litigation.
A. Plaintiff's Advantages in Pursuing a Civil RICO Cause of Action
A plaintiff injured in a securities transaction is faced with the limita-
tions in scope, and the requirements of pleading and proof of the federal
securities laws, i.e., the express causes of action under sections 11 and 12
of the 1933 Act and the implied remedy under rule lOb-5 of the 1934
Act.2 12 As a result, the plaintiff often joins a civil RICO claim, so long as
the initial pleading standards of RICO may be met. Through use of civil
RICO, the plaintiff receives advantages with regard to the liberal con-
struction clause, permissible defendants, forum choice, statute of limita-
tions, damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and discovery. In addition, a
civil RICO claim may be available in cases involving investment transac-
tions where no remedy exists under the federal securities laws. A plain-
tiff may avoid rule lOb-5 requirements of materiality and reliance
through civil RICO, as well as avoid the Blue Chip purchaser/seller stand-
ing requirement. Cases of internal corporate mismanagement or
breaches of fiduciary duty not actionable under rule lOb-5 may poten-
tially be pursued under civil RICO. In addition, the "in terrorem" effect
of potential treble damages under civil RICO might induce a defendant
to settle a securities violation at one hundred cents on the dollar, rather
than at a fraction of the damage claim which is more common in ordinary
securities litigation.
1. Liberal Construction Clause
Nowhere is the advantage in using civil RICO more visible than in
RICO's liberal construction clause which states, "[t]he provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 213
The elasticity of several of RICO's key requirements including "pattern"
and "enterprise," combined with this liberal directive, support a broad
212 See supra notes 28-161 and accompanying text.
213 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947
(1970). This language was not included in the codified version of the statute, but it is still consid-
ered the law. See Abell v. United States, 518 F.2d 1369, 1376-77 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (statutes at large
prevail over codified law when they are in conflict), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976). See also Blakey,
The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 245
n,25 (1982) (discussing co- t treatment of liberal construction clause); Note, RICO and the Liberal
Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980); Note, Liberal Construction and Severe Sentencing Help
RICO Achieve Its Legislative Goals, 13 Loy. U. CHi. LJ. 1055 (1982); Note, Liberal Construction of Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: Section 904(a) v. the Doctrine of Strict Construction, 12 RuTGERS
L.J. 69 (1980).
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application of the statute in favor of private party plaintiffs. In effect, the
clause abrogates the usual federal "rule of lenity" which requires that
criminal statutes be interpreted narrowly in favor of defendants. 2 14 The
Supreme Court noted in Sedima, "if Congress' liberal-construction man-
date is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO's remedial
purposes are most evident. '215
2. Scope of Potential Defendants: Aiding and Abetting
Liability under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act is limited to cer-
tain classes of defendants, i.e., those classes of defendants specified in
section 11 (a).21 6 Section 12 defendants are limited by Pinter v. Dahl to
the actual sellers or those who directly and actively participated in the
sale in question. 21 7 Section 11 defendants who did not sign the registra-
tion statement but are deemed experts due to their relationship to infor-
mation in the registration statement possess a statutory due diligence
defense.218 Outside professionals, who may have been involved in the
sale or preparation of offering materials but do not meet the standard set
forth in Pinter v. Dahl are not liable under section 12. In addition, section
12 defendants possess a reasonable care defense. 21 9 All these classes of
persons may have potential liability under civil RICO. Indeed, it is often
these types of professional defendants upon whose "deep pockets" civil
RICO plaintiffs focus. 220
Even though "aiding and abetting" derivative liability is not avail-
able in cases brought under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act,221 it is
clearly available in RICO litigation.222 After all, the RICO statute is
found in title 18-the Federal Criminal Code-and in that same title 18
is found the principal federal "aiding and abetting" provision, 18 U.S.C.§ 2.
3. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Rule lOb-5 cases and other 1934 Act remedies must be pursued ex-
clusively in the federal courts.22 3 However, in Tafflin v. Levitt, 224 the
Supreme Court squarely determined that state courts possess concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts over all civil RICO private treble damage
214 See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100,
112 (1979); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955);
FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
215 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985).
216 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
220 See Poker, Reaching A Deep Pocket Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72
MAR. L. REv. 511 (1989).
221 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir.
1987); Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986). Aiding
and abetting is embraced in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1976), and is often
applied in civil cases, see, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481-86 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
223 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
224 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
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claims.225 In so holding, the Court found no indication that Congress
intended exclusive federal jurisdiction, and further found that no "clear
incompatibility" existed between state court jurisdiction and federal in-
terests as reflected in the RICO statute. In addition, the Supreme Court
held that concurrent state jurisdiction would further the remedial pur-
poses as called for in RICO's liberal construction clause. 226
Cases brought under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act have always
been susceptible to litigation in either state or federal courts, while rule
lOb-5 cases must necessarily be filed solely in federal court. However, as
a result of Tafflin, a plaintiff can now bring a civil RICO case based on
rule lOb-5 securities fraud predicate offenses in state court. This may in-
crease the use of state courts in securities litigation, and concomitantly
increase the use of civil RICO therein.227
4. Statute of Limitations
In Agency Holding Corporation v. Malley-Duff & Associates,228 the
Supreme Court established a uniform statute of limitations for civil
RICO actions. The Court held that the similarities in purpose and struc-
ture between RICO and the Clayton Act, and the legislative intent to
pattern RICO's civil provision on the Clayton Act, favored adoption of
the Clayton Act's uniform four-year statute of limitations in civil RICO
claims.229 The designation of the appropriate time for the accrual of a
civil RICO claim was expressly reserved by the Court.230
As a result of Malley-Duff, a civil RICO plaintiff may be given more
time to commence a damages action than the applicable 1933 and 1934
Acts provisions allow. Section 13 of the 1933 Act establishes a one- to
three-year statute of limitations for sections 11 and 12 actions.231 In
some circuits, rule 10b-5 claims will be governed by a forum state's com-
mon law fraud limitations period or a blue sky securities fraud limitations
period that is as short as two or three years. In other circuits, rule lOb-5
claims may be covered by the analogous one year/three year section 13
225 Following its decision in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), the Court
looked for explicit legislative intent to make jurisdiction exclusive or for clear incompatibility be-
tween state and federal jurisdiction. Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 795. Of course, the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over federal anti-trust treble damage claims, and the Court has often relied on
an antitrust analogy in construing RICO. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143 (1987). The Court in Taffin, nevertheless, held that its Gulf Offshore precedent pre-
cluded it from deciding the concurrent exclusive jurisdiction issue solely on the Clayton Act analogy.
110 S. Ct. at 796-97.
226 Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 797-99.
227 Some commentators have suggested that there may be a resistance by many local attorneys to
litigate in federal court. See, e.g., Poker, supra note 8, at 523:
In the past... many attorneys may have been reluctant to file a suit under RICO because
they wished to avoid federal court. Consequently, the attorneys only filed a suit under state
law. Attorneys may have based their decision to avoid federal court on the fact that they
were more familiar with state courts than with federal courts, or because the federal courts
were an inconvenient forum.
228 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
229 I& at 146.
230 Id. at 156-57. For a detailed exploration of the thorny issue of accrual in a civil RICO case,
see Note, "Mother of Mercy, Is This the Beginning of RICO?" The Proper Point of Accrual of a Private Civil
RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 172 (1990).
231 See supra notes 34, 50-51 and accompanying text.
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limitations period.232 Yet, civil RICO will now always provide these
claims with a uniform four-year limitations period if they are pleaded as
securities, mail or wire fraud predicate offenses.
5. Damages, Costs and Attorneys' Fees
A successful plaintiff under civil RICO is awarded treble damages,
costs and attorneys' fees in every case. 23 3 A successful plaintiff in a 1933
or 1934 Act federal securities law case receives only actual damages. 23 4
There is no certainty of recovery of costs or attorneys' fees in 1933 and
1934 Act cases. 235 The "in terrorem" effect of potential treble damages,
and automatic imposition of costs and attorneys' fees often enable plain-
tiffs to extract favorable settlements even if their civil RICO claims are
weak. 23 6 The limitations on damages in the 1933 and 1934 Acts help
insure that only proper claims are brought and reduce the incentive for a
large settlement unless plaintiff's case is substantial. On the other hand,
such damages limitations also discourage many plaintiffs who possess
small claims from seeking redress under the 1933 and 1934 Acts; civil
RICO treble damages provide them with an incentive to do so.
6. Discovery
Since a "pattern" of racketeering activity may stretch over a substan-
tial period of time, a plaintiff in a civil RICO case undoubtedly will be
able to engage in more far-ranging discovery than would be available
solely on a substantive 1933 or 1934 Act claim.23 7 However, district
courts are likely to control discovery through the courts' discretionary
powers in civil RICO cases to prevent significant discovery abuses. 238
7. Using Mail and Wire Fraud Predicate Offenses to Fill the Holes in
a Securities Fraud Claim
The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, has for many years
been one of the most widely used prosecutorial tools in federal "white
collar" criminal cases. 239 Mail fraud, 240 along with its companion wire
232 See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text. To date, no circuit has yet adopted for rule
lOb-5 suits the analogous five-year limitations period included in newly enacted § 20A of the 1934
Act. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
233 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
234 See supra notes 72-73, 132-39 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 44-45, 140-43 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND COR-
RuPr ORcAIZATIONS ACr, S. REP. No. 269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990), where Congress specifi-
cally noted that civil RICO actions often "include imaginative attempts to use RICO's treble
damages remedy to leverage more favorable settlements in ordinary civil, even familial, disputes."
237 See, eg., Buffone, Discovery in Civil RICO Litigation, 3 RICO L. REP. 168 (1986); Matus, Plaintiffs'
Discovery in Civil RICO Cases, 13 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., Oct. 1988, at 23.
238 See, e.g., Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,214-17 (D. Mass. 1981).
239 See Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the
Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117, 126 (1981) ("Among prosecutors, a
well-known maxim says 'when in doubt, charge mail fraud.' "); Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute
(Part 1), 18 Dug. L. REv. 771 (1980) ("To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud
statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt .45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love.
We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law 'darling,' but we always
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fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,241 are widely used RICO "predicate of-
fenses." 242 Indeed, mail, wire and securities fraud-the so-called "com-
mercial fraud" predicate offenses-predominate in civil RICO cases. 243
It is important to note that neither the mail nor wire fraud statutes ex-
pressly provide for a private party civil damages remedy. Furthermore,
the federal courts have consistently refused to find an implied federal
private damages cause of action based upon criminal mail or wire fraud
violations. 244 Nevertheless, through civil RICO, a victim of a "pattern"
come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable
familiarity. It understands us and, like many a foolish spouse, we like to think we understand it.").
240 In order to make out a mail fraud claim, a plaintiff must allege three elements: "(1) the de-
fendant's participation in some scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) the use of the mails 'caused by'
defendant or someone associated with the scheme; and (3) the use of the mails for the purpose of
executing the scheme." United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1985); accord Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1207-08
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 925 (1985); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (1 1th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 928 (1980). See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1986) (enumerating elements of both wire and mail fraud in connection with civil RICO action).
Plaintiff must also plead and prove the defendant's specific intent to defraud. Id. See also United
States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164 (1985); United States v.
Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Fowler, 735 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
241 A wire fraud claim has the same elements as mail fraud, except that a use of the United States'
wires in furtherance of the scheme must be proven in lieu of a mailing. Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d
at 1400. However, the use of the wires must be interstate to constitute wire fraud, whereas an intra-
state mailing can constitute mail fraud. See Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976); Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank v. Ellis, 609 F. Supp. 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aft'd, 810 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Carpen-
ter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) ("The mail and wire fraud statutes share the same
language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to both sets of offenses...").
See also Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208 (11 th Cir. 1989); United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989); United States v. Bruno, 809 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981); United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1976). For an
excellent summary of the elements and application of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, see
Coffee & Whitehead, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, in 0. OBERMAIER & R.
MORVILLO, WHrrE COLLAR CRIME: BuSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.01 (1990).
242 See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 239-82 (Ch. 10. "Mail, Wire and Securities
Fraud as Predicate Offenses"). See also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989); United States
v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Coffee, The Metastasis of
Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the 'Evolution'of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 45 (1980); Rakoff, supra
note 239; Note, Intra-corporate Mail and Wire Fraud-" Criminal Liability For Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J.
1427 (1985).
243 Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 55-58, 243.
244 In Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1178 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth Circuit held that
the mail fraud statute is "a bare criminal statute with no indication of any intent to create a private
cause of action." Accord, Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977); Oppenheim v.
Sterling, 368 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011 (1967). See also Creech v. Federal
Land Bank of Wichita, 647 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D. Colo. 1986); Krupnick v. Union National Bank,
470 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Milburn v. Blackfica Promotions, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 434,
435 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Likewise, the courts have consistently refused to recognize an implied private
party damages cause of action in favor of victims of wire fraud offenses. See Napper v. Anderson,
Henly, Shields, Bradford & Prichard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837
(1975) (no evidence that Congress intended to grant federal question jurisdiction for civil cases
under wire fraud statute). See also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), af'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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of mail or wire fraud violations committed with the requisite nexus to an
"enterprise" can pursue an express cause of action for treble damages,
costs and attorneys' fees.
More importantly, a securities law plaintiff can use mail fraud predi-
cate offenses (or wire fraud predicates) to elevate certain defective securi-
ties fraud claims into wholly valid civil RICO treble damage claims.245 A
plaintiff pursuing a damages claim under the federal securities laws must
demonstrate that the transaction or investment arrangement in question
involves a "security" within the coverage of the appropriate federal se-
curities statute.246 A civil RICO plaintiff who is incapable of satisfying
this "security" requirement may bypass this securities law requirement
by framing the civil RICO charge in terms of mail or wire fraud. 247
Even though commodities fraud is not a predicate offense in the
RICO statutes, commodities fraud cases may be converted into civil
RICO cases through use of mail and wire fraud predicate offenses. 248
Whenever a plaintiff has any doubt whether a particular instrument is a
"security" covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts-i.e., various options or
futures instruments or hybrids thereof-mail fraud and wire fraud predi-
cates provide the vehicle to frame a damages case under civil RICO.
8. Internal Corporate Mismanagement and Fiduciary Breaches: The
"McNally Amendment" to Mail and Wire Fraud
The Supreme Court held in the Santa Fe case 249 that a mere breach
of fiduciary duty, in the absence of "deception," will not support an im-
plied damages cause of action under rule IOb-5. 250 Such internal corpo-
rate mismanagement must be pursued under appropriate state law.25' It
will not constitute federal securities "fraud" under rule lOb-5.
However, Congress recently enacted an amendment to the mail and
wire fraud statutes which provides "[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the
term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to de-
prive another of the intangible right of honest services. ' 252 The new law
was passed in direct response to the Supreme Court's invalidation of the
245 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 505 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
246 Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts contain statutory definitions of "security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). See SEC v. Wj. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (estab-
lishing an analytical framework for determining ad hoc whether an investment contract is a "security"
under the federal securities laws).
247 See, e.g., Williamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 n.5 (D. Or.
1984) (improper allegation of security not sufficient reason for dismissal); Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (RICO allegations sufficient for claim to
proceed despite question as to whether security or loan).
248 See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 505 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Parnes v. Heinhold Commod-
ities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980)). See also LTD Commodities, Inc. v. Perederij, 699 F.2d
404 (7th Cir. 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Cf. Taylor v. Bear
Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
249 Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
250 See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
251 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478.
252 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West Supp. 1989).
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so-called "intangible rights" doctrine of mail and wire fraud in McNally v.
United States.253
The McNally decision upset an entire body of criminal mail fraud law
which had been developed through judicial interpretation in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s and had extended the reach of the mail fraud statute to
cover schemes involving the deprivation of "intangible rights" and
breaches of fiduciary duty, as well as those involving the loss of money or
property.254 Swift congressional action aimed at reversing the McNally
holding led to the passage of section 1346.255 This formal expansion of
the definition of "scheme or artifice to defraud" to include "intangible
rights" will trigger an expansion of the scope of both criminal and civil
RICO.
2 5 6
Since mail and wire fraud now reach intangible rights as opposed to
merely intangible property, mere breaches of fiduciary duty-at least
those in connection with which there is a right to "honest services"-may
well become predicate offenses in a wide range of new civil RICO
claims. 257 If so, although the Santa Fe doctrine will preclude rule 10b-5
253 483 U.S. 350 (1987). In McNally, the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute is "lim-
ited in scope to the protection of property rights," id. at 360, and "does not refer to the intangible
right of the citizenry to good government." Id. at 356. McNally involved the conviction of a govern-
ment official and a private citizen for mail fraud in connection with the selection of insurance agen-
cies for the state of Kentucky. The prosecution argued that "petitioners' participation in a self-
dealing patronage scheme defrauded the citizens and government of Kentucky of certain 'intangible
rights,' such as the right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly." Id at 352. The
Supreme Court held that the language of the mail fraud statute prohibited prosecution unless there
was a showing that the defendant's conduct resulted in the loss of money or property. Since the
government alleged only the loss of an intangible right, the defendants' convictions were reversed.
Id. at 361. See Rakoff, Intangible Rights and Wrongs: The McNally Case, 6 RICO L. REP. 254 (1987);
Note, McNally v. United States and Its Effect on the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 39 MERCER L. REV. 697
(1988). Cf. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181 (1988).
254 See, e.g., Coffee, Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter
and the Enduring Problem of Over Criminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988); Coffee, supra note
242; Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront
to Federalism, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 63 (1978); Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corrup-
tion Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHi. L. REV. 562 (1980); see also Civil RICO
Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 251-54.
255 See Rakoff, Congressional Macho, 8 RICO L. REP. 860 (1988) (discussing impact of § 1346 on
RICO). See also United States v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (Section 1346 "may be
viewed as restoring the law to its state prior to the McNally decision.").
256 Civil RICO provides an express private party cause of action for treble damages as long as the
plaintiff can prove that the defendant engaged in at least two predicate acts of mail or wire fraud as
part of a pattern of racketeering activity that has a requisite connection to an enterprise. See
Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1987) ("An imaginative plain-
tiff could take virtually any illegal occurrence and point to acts preparatory to the occurrence, usually
the use of the telephone or mails, as meeting the requirement of pattern.") If a plaintiff can show
that the defendant has engaged in activity amounting to a patten of indictable offenses under either
the mail or wire fraud statute, then civil RICO's private party treble damage remedy will facially be
available. This is true despite the fact that due to the borderline nature of any particular case a
federal prosecutor, exercising prosecutorial discretion pursuant to the Department ofJustice Crimi-
nal RICO Guidelines and the general Principles of Federal Prosecution, may decline to pursue a
criminal prosecution for either a RICO offense or for an underlying substantive mail or wire fraud
offense. See U.S. A-rrORNEYS' MANUAL, §§ 9-27.000 - 9-27.760. For the prosecutorial guidelines spe-
cifically applicable to mail fraud, see U.S. ArrORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9-43.120. See also the concurring
opinion of Ninth Circuit Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Kennedy in Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.
Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986).
257 The question is whether the intangible rights/breach of fiduciary duty theories of criminal
mail and wire fraud violations pursued in cases like the following will now spawn a new generation of
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securities law claims, a whole new range of state law internal corporate
mismanagement claims may be turned into civil RICO treble damages
claims. Thus, although Congress ostensibly acted solely to preserve what
had been the status quo of criminal mail fraud law before the Supreme
Court's action in McNally, 258 it inadvertently may have created a pot-
pourri of new interpretive problems in future civil RICO cases.
9. Insider Trading: Misappropriation Theory
Although the Supreme Court split 4 to 4 in United States v. Carpen-
ter,259 as to whether the "misappropriation theory" will support rule lOb-
5 liability, it unanimously and squarely held in Carpenter that the mail
fraud statute is violated by "misappropriation" of money, property or
information through breach of a fiduciary duty, such as a duty to render
honest services. 260 The "McNally amendment" to the mail and wire
fraud statutes, coupled with the Carpenter mail fraud holding, indicates
that a broad range of "misappropriation theory" insider-trading cases
that are questionable under rule lOb-5 dearly could be pursued as civil
RICO "breach of duty" mail fraud cases. 261
10. Materiality and Reliance
Proof of "materiality" is required in all section 12(2) and rule lOb-5
securities fraud cases, 262 and proof of "reliance" is required in rule lOb-5
cases, although it may be presumed in a section 12(2) case. 263 However,
proof of "materiality" and "reliance" may not necessarily be required in
a particular mail or wire fraud offense. 264 Thus, use of mail or wire fraud
novel civil RICO claims. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. Richer-
son, 833 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 944 (1985); United States v. Siegal, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Margiotta, 688
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982);
United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United
States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978). See also United
States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); United States v.
Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Bruno, 809 F.2d 1097 (5th Cr.), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1057 (1987); United States v. UniOil, Inc., 710 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976). But cf.
United States v. Baldinger, 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1988); United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir. 1987).
258 See United States v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
259 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
260 Id. at 22. See also Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1388.
261 See, e.g., Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (employee-journalist breaches duty to employer-newspaper);
United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (employee-lawyer breaches duties to em-
ployer-law firm and its clients), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1984) (employee-copy reader breaches duties to employer-print'ing firm and its clients), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (employee-inyestment banker breaches duties to
employer-investment banking firm and its client); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(employee-office manager breaches duties to employer-law firm and its clients).
262 See supra notes 48, 70 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
264 J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 2.02(1] (1990):
Probably none of the predicate acts which can form the basis for a civil RICO claim are
broader than the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. These statutes simply prohibit any
use of the mails or of interstate telephone calls in furtherance of any fraudulent scheme.
Unlike many other predicate acts, the mail and wire fraud statutes'do not require pleading
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predicates in a civil RICO claim might circumvent the materiality and
reliance requirements of rule 1Ob-5 securities fraud.265
B. Complexities and Unresolved Issues in Utilizing Civil RICO in Federal
Securities Litigation
Since it is likely that civil RICO will continue to be extensively ap-
plied in securities cases, several important issues must be litigated in the
1990s. These issues include the scope of the securities fraud predicate
offenses, whether the Blue Chip purchaser/seller standing limitation is su-
perimposed on civil RICO securities cases, the proper scienter standard,
injury/causation distinctions, the availability of equitable relief, and the
application of respondeat superior, as well as the further definition of
"pattern" and "enterprise."
1. Scope of the Securities Fraud Predicate Offense: Are Both
Purchases and Sales Covered?
Unlike the mail and wire fraud predicates-which are designated in
the statute by specific reference to sections 1341 and 1343 of title 18-
the securities fraud predicate offense in the RICO statute is not desig-
nated by any reference whatsoever to any particular tide or section of the
United States Code or any of the federal securities statutes. Rather, the
definition of "racketeering activity" in section 1961(1) of the RICO stat-
ute includes "any offense involving... fraud in the sale of securities...
punishable under any law of the United States." 266
Substantial disagreement exists in case law precedent as to the in-
tended scope or breadth of the securities fraud predicate offense.
RICO's legislative history does not reveal whether Congress had one or
more particular provisions of the federal securities laws in mind when it
crafted this particular predicate offense. 267 District courts have dis-
agreed about which fraud provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts are sub-
of misrepresentation, reliance or injury stemming directly from the conduct at issue, i.e.,
the mail or wire communication. The communication need only be in furtherance of a
scheme which itself intentionally or recklessly causes the harm. [footnotes omitted.]
265 Professor Blakey criticizes two Eighth Circuit opinions that have superimposed the common
law fraud elements of materiality and reliance upon civil RICO claims pursued with allegations of
mail or wire fraud predicate offenses-i.e. Flowers v. Continental Grain Co., 775 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir.
1985) and Horn v. Ray. E. Friedman Co., 776 F.2d 777, 780-82 (8th Cir. 1985). See Blakey, RICO
Litigation Update in MATHEWS, SIXrH ANNUAL RICO LITIGATION UPDATE 378-80 (1990). Professor
Blakey cites McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J. 1985), as the proper
rule as to the materiality issue since McLendon is in accord with general mail fraud jurisprudence and
makes no requirement for a showing of material misrepresentation or omission for the predicate act
of mail fraud in a civil RICO complaint. Id. at 379. Professor Blakey cites the following cases to
refute the Eighth Circuit Horn and Flowers requirement of reliance in a civil RICO mail or wire fraud
case: Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481-83 (5th Cir. 1986)
and Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1129-30 (5th Cir. 1988). Id. at 379-80. However,
Professor Blakey concedes that while "reliance" may not be necessary for proof of mail or wire
"fraud," it may be necessary for proof of requisite "causation." IdE at 380 (citing Brandenberg v.
Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1187, 1188 n.10 (4th Cir. 1988)).
266 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1988).
267 See generally Glanz, supra note 7.
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sumed by the RICO securities fraud predicate, and appellate courts have
not yet squarely faced the issue.268
The two principal anti-fraud provisions in the federal securities stat-
utes are section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,2 6 9 and section 10(b) of the 1934
Act as fleshed out by rule lOb-5. 270 These are the anti-fraud provisions
that are most commonly utilized in criminal securities fraud prosecu-
tions271 and in SEC civil injunction enforcement actions. 272 Section
17(a) fraud embraces a much more narrow range of conduct than rule
lOb-5 fraud. Section 17(a) prohibits fraud solely in the offer or sale of a
security. However, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 prohibit fraud in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security. Rule lOb-5 has a much broader
sphere of coverage than section 17(a), as a result of including
"purchases" as well as sales, and by virtue of its elastic "in connection
with" nexus element.
Although RICO's language in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) more closely
resembles section 17(a) than it does rule lOb-5-the RICO provision
does not specifically mention "purchase," and refers to fraud in the sale,
not in connection with the sale-many courts have accepted rule lOb-5
claims,' even though they embrace fraud in a securities purchase, as valid
civil RICO predicate offenses. 273 For example, in In Re Catanella and E. F.
Hutton & Company Securities Litigation,274 in a broker-dealer "churning"
case brought under both rule lOb-5 and civil RICO, the court stated that
in securities fraud cases "the reach of RICO should extend to both
purchases and sales."' 275 In addition, a number of courts have allowed
section 13(d) claims-i.e. violations of the "Williams Act" amendments
268 The Second Circuit noted in a seminal civil RICO securities fraud case, Moss v. Morgan Stan-
ley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 18-19 n.14 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984):
Although RICO provides that "fraud in the sale of securities" may constitute "racke-
teering activity," it supplies neither a definition of "fraud" nor a reference to other federal
laws contemplated in drafting this "predicate offense."
The district court did not define "RICO fraud" when it dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
Similarly, we need not decide this complex and far-reaching question ... [Als neither com-
mon law fraud nor traditional securities fraud underpins plaintiff's RICO claim, we need
not delineate RICO's definition of "fraud in the sale of securities."
269 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
270 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1988).
271 See, e.g., Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The
Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 901 (1971).
272 See, e.g., Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions (Parts I and II), 5 REv. SEC. REG. No. 4 at 949
(Feb. 18, 1972) and 5 REv. SEc. REG. No. 6 at 969 (March 22, 1972).
273 See, e.g., International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987); USACO Coal
Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982); Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Utah 1989); Department of Economic Dev. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 683 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (only determination is whether fraud is "in connection with
the purchase or sale."); Binkley v. Sheaffer, 609 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Alfaro v. E. F. Hutton
& Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Finn v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Witt v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1985);James v. Meinke, 606
F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Kravetz v. Bruckenfeld, 591 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Econo-
Car Int'l, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Mass. 1984); Wilcox v. Sit, 586 F.
Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1984); In Re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342 (M.D.N.C. 1984);
Lickhalter v. System Dev. Corp., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,459 (C.D. Cal.
1984); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
274 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
275 Id at 1425 n.56.
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to the 1934 Act--embracing nondisclosure of purchasing over five percent
of an issuer's securities, to constitute valid RICO predicate offenses.27 6
For example, in Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc.,277 the
district court held that section 13(d) claims may be valid civil RICO se-
curities fraud predicate offenses, stating: "The remedial purpose of the
[RICO] statute would appear to encompass fraud committed by the pur-
chaser of securities, as well as by the seller." 278
Only recently have the courts begun to construe the precise lan-
guage of RICO's securities fraud predicate offense more narrowly.2 79
For example, in First Pacific Bancorp v. Bro,280 the Ninth Circuit held that
violations of sections 13(d) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act cannot be RICO
securities fraud predicate offenses because neither of these provisions
embrace fraud "in the sale" of a security. The District Court in In re Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. Securities Litigation28' refused to apply civil RICO to
facts involving alleged fraud in connection with the purchase of securities
in a rule lOb-5 securities case. The court noted that in Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc. ,282 the Second Circuit had determined not to address the
"complex and far-reaching question" whether RICO's securities fraud
predicate offense covers all securities fraud embraced by rule lOb-5.2 83
After analyzing the plain wording of section 1961(1) (D) pertaining to
"fraud in the sale of securities," and the sparse legislative history, the Par
court held that "securities fraud is only a [RICO] predicate offense if the
fraud occurs in the actual sale of a security" 284 and that "only fraud that
occurs as part of the actual securities [sale] transaction is a predicate act."'28 5
The Par court built upon dicta of the Fourth Circuit in International
Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin,286 as well as the views of several commenta-
276 See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 728 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Polycast Technology Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Hanna Mining Co., v. Norcen Energy Resources
Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-82
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. 1981). See also Lou v. Belzberg, 834
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988); cf. University Bank & Trust Co. v. Glad-
stone, 574 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Mass. 1983).
277 [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. 1981).
278 Id. at 92,215. The Court specifically relied upon RICO's liberal construction clause. Id
279 See First Pac. Bancorp v. Bro, 847 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1988) (violations of §§ 13(d) and 14(e) of
the 1934 Act cannot be RICO securities fraud predicate offenses because neither of these provisions
embrace fraud "in the sale" of a security).
280 847 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1988).
281 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
282 719 F.2d 5, 19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
283 733 F. Supp. at 683.
284 Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
285 Id. at 684 (emphasis added). "[G]iving § 1961(1)(D) its plain meaning, RICO does not incor-
porate all violations of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, but rather is limited to those fraudulent acts that
occur in an actual sale transaction." Id. at 683.
286 812 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The statutory language describing the [securities fraud]
predicate offense. . . is, however, narrow and suggests the pivotal role of the actual sales
transaction.")
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tors. 28 7 In my view, other courts should pay heed to the Par Pharmaceuti-
cal court's rationale. 288
2. Blue Chip Purchaser/Seller Standing Issue
A private party plaintiff must satisfy the Blue Chip purchaser/seller
standing requirement to pursue a rule 10b-5 damages claim.28 9 Simi-
larly, plaintiffs in a section 11 or section 12 case must have purchased the
security at issue. But the courts are in disagreement as to whether a se-
curities fraud plaintiff needs to satisfy the Blue Chip standing requirement
to pursue a civil RICO claim based upon either securities fraud predicate
offenses, or mail or wire fraud predicate offenses. Both the Eleventh and
the Ninth Circuits have squarely held that there is no "purchase or sale"
standing requirement in a civil RICO securities fraud case.290 Both cir-
cuits hold that so long as a plaintiff is injured directly, rather than deriva-
tively, by reason of defendant's RICO violation, standing exists for a civil
RICO treble damage claim.
The Eleventh Circuit in Securities Investor Protection Corporation v.
Vigman placed great emphasis on the fact that private plaintiff actions
under rule lOb-5 are implied while Congress expressly provided for civil
RICO suits. The "in connection with the purchase or sale" language of
rule l0b-5291 combined with the absence of an express right of action
necessitates strict construction of the 1934 Act in rule lOb-5 cases. In
contrast, the express language of section 1964(c) providing treble dam-
ages, combined with the broad language of the "fraud in the sale of se-
curities" predicate offense in section 1962, as well as the RICO's liberal
287 See, e.g., Glanz, supra note 7, at 1542 ("Where the wrongful act alleged is a failure to properly
disclose information, such violation.., does not constitute a [securities fraud] predicate offense
under RICO.").
288 It is reasonable to assume that Congress, had it wanted to make the RICO predicate acts
coextensive with § 10(b), would have used the same or similar language in § 1961(1)(D)
that it used in § 10(b). Had Congress intended RICO to be coextensive with § 10(b), it
certainly knew how to do so. However, "fraud in the sale of securities" is quite limited in
comparison to the broader language Congress used in § 10(b), which prohibits fraud "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." The "in connection with" language
provides standing only to plaintiffs who have either purchased or sold securities, but it does
not limit liability to defendants who sold or bought from the plaintiffs. Thus, under the "in
connection with" requirement, a defendant may be held liable even though he was not a
party to a securities transaction. This concept arose direly out of the "in connection with"
language. The language in § 1961(1)(D) - "fraud in the sale of securities" - is much less
susceptible to such an interpretation, and to stretch the language so far in the absence of
any evidence that Congress intended such a result would be an act ofjudicial legislation.
When one considers that Congress "enacted this legislation in 1970 against the devel-
oped backdrop of almost forty years of federal securities law," the fact that Congress opted
not to use the language "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," or some-
thing similar, must be considered significant and meaningful.
733 F. Supp. at 683-84 (footnotes and citations omitted). Practitioners should be wary of relying
upon broad generalizations of commentators that do not yet reflect the recent judicial narrowing of
the securities fraud predicate offense; e.g., J. RAKOFF & H: GOLDSTEIN, RICO--CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
LAW AND STRATEGY § 2.02[2] (1990) (the RICO securities fraud predicate offense "certainly reaches
to both purchasers and sellers, as do the Federal Securities laws.").
289 See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
290 Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Securities Inv. Pro-
tection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
291 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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construction clause, illustrate the need for an expansive
interpretation.292
Nevertheless, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits both apply the Blue
Chip purchaser/seller standing requirement to civil RICO securities law
claims. 293 In Zepkin, the Fourth Circuit held that, once the underlying
rule lOb-5 fraud claim is dismissed for lack of standing, the civil RICO
claim also falls due to lack of standing. In other words, the standing re-
quirements of the rule lOb-5 predicate offenses are superimposed onto
the civil RICO claim. In Brannan, the Eighth Circuit went even farther
than Zepkin. The Brannan court dismissed the rule 1Ob-5 claim for lack of
purchaser/seller standing294 and then dismissed the RICO claim, which
was based upon both rule lOb-5 predicate acts and wire fraud predicate
acts. Thus, Brannan holds that when the securities fraud predicate of-
fenses are dismissed for lack of standing under the Blue Chip purchaser/
seller requirement, that same conduct cannot be pleaded as wire fraud
(or presumably mail fraud) predicate offenses in an effort to plug the
standing "loophole" in the securities fraud claim.295 In Forkin v. Rooney
Pace, Inc. ,296 the Eighth Circuit held that once the securities fraud claims
were dismissed based upon a lack of proof of the requisite "deception"
to constitute Rule IOb-5 fraud, the civil RICO claim, embracing the same
conduct but alleging securities, wire and mail fraud predicate offenses,
was also dismissed.
The Second Circuit also appears to apply a standing rule somewhat
like the Blue Chip requirement to a securities fraud civil RICO claim. 297
In Moss, one of the defendants (Newman) had been criminally convicted
for rule lOb-5 felonies for trading on misappropriated non-public infor-
mation.2 98 Moss held that the plaintiff's rule lOb-5 claims were defective
due to lack of standing-defendant Newman owed no duty to the plaintiff
that would support an implied rule lOb-5 damage action on behalf of the
292 Other cases indicating that civil RICO has no purchaser/seller standing requirement4pclude
Smith v. Ayers, 845 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1988) (rule lOb-5 claim dismissed for lack of reliance and
because plaintiff also was not a purchaser or seller; but court looks for other ground to dismiss civil
RICO claim and accepts as one valid predicate act the securities fraud-on another party as seller);
Silverman v. Senft, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(purchaser/seller requirement for securities fraud claim does not apply to civil RICO claim).
293 See International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987); Brannan v. Eisen-
stein, 804 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1986); Forkin v. Rooney Pace, Inc. 804 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1986).
294 804 F.2d at 1045-46.
295 Brannan, 804 F.2d at 1046-47:
[The directors allege securities fraud and wire fraud as the basis of racketeering activity.
Since we have already found that the directors' state and federal securities fraud claims as
well as the common law fraud claim were properly dismissed, the directors may not rely upon the
same conduct as the basis of any securities fraud that may constitute racketeering activity.
As to the remaining alleged predicate act, wire fraud requires a fraudulent scheme and
use of the wire or telephone in furtherance of the scheme. See United States v. Andrade,
787 F.2d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 1986). The fraudulent scheme alleged by the directors, how-
ever, consists solely of statements and omissions by Schroeder and Eisenstein in connection
with the sales of securities. Since we have affirmed the dismissal of the securities fraud claims, the
same conduct cannot constitute a fraudulent scheme giving rise to a wire fraud claim. Thus, wire fraud
also fails as a basis for racketeering activity .... [T]he RICO claim must be dismissed. (Emphasis
added).
296 804 F.2d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1986).
297 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
298 See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
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plaintif.299 Despite Newman's criminal convictions on rule lOb-5
charges, the Moss court held that plaintiff's lack of rule 10b-5 standing
precluded a civil RICO claim by plaintiff on the same alleged securities
violations.300 However, some "misappropriation" cases that may be de-
fective as securities fraud claims because they lack "purchaser/seller"
standing or fail to embrace the requisite injury causation requirements,
may nevertheless be pursued as civil RICO claims based upon securities,
mail or wire fraud embracing the same conduct. For example, in FMC
Corporation v. Boesky, 30 the district court dismissed all substantive securi-
ties law damage claims due to lack of "purchaser/seller" standing or lack
of proper injury/causation requisites, but allowed all the civil RICO
claims to proceed based upon securities fraud predicate offenses embrac-
ing the same conduct 30 2
3. Scienter/Criminal Intent
While a rule lOb-5 implied civil damages cause of action requires
proof of scienter,30 3 section 11 and section 12 claims do not.3°4 Indeed,
even civil violations of sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act require
only proof of negligence.305 In contrast, it is dear that securities fraud
civil RICO claims cannot be based on merely negligent conduct.30 6 A
criminal intent or scienter requirement must be proven with regard to
each alleged securities fraud predicate offense, as well as with regard to
the overall RICO violation itself, which embraces "pattern" and "enter-
prise" as well as predicate offenses.30 7
Apart from whether RICO's securities fraud predicate offense is as
elastic as rule lOb-5, or as rigidly narrow as section 17(a), one thing
299 In a sense, Moss was a combination standing/causation ruling. The plaintiffs were sellers, but
in the open market, not to defendant Newman, and Newman did commit fraud "in connection with"
his purchases, but not in connection with plaintiffs' sales; therefore, the nexus between the defend-
ant's fraud and the plaintiff's injury did not satisfy rule lOb-5's causation requirement.
300 The district court in Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191 (D.
Utah 1989) followed Zepkin, Brannan, and Moss in superimposing the Blue Chip standing requirement
upon civil RICO claims in a securities fraud suit: "[Pirivate persons have standing to bring RICO
daims based on securities violations under Rule lOb-5 only if they are purchasers or sellers." Cf.
First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bro, 847 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1988).
301 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1988).
302 727 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. IM. 1989).
303 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
304 Under Section 11, the issuer has strict liability; other defendants can prove a "due diligence"
defense. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Under Section 12(1), the seller has virtually strict
liability. See supra note 60. Under Section 12(2) defendants can prove a "due care" or "reasonable
care" defense. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 92.
306 Proof of scienter is required for all rule 10-b and § 17(a)(1) claims. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (private civil claim); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (SEC
enforcement action). To the extent that the Supreme Court has sanctioned § 17(a)(2) and (3) claims
on proof of only negligent conduct, those negligence-based securities fraud claims cannot constitute
predicate offenses in civil RICO cases.
307 See, e.g., Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362,
1371 n.6 (D. Conn. 1987) ("liability under RICO should require general knowledge of the enter-
prise's racketeering activity even if liability under section 10(b) ... only requires reckless disregard
of the truth" because required showing of criminal intent for RICO violation goes beyond necessary
scienter showing for single predicate offense). See also United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 512
(2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1980).
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should be crystal clear: civil RICO applies to only criminal violations of
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.A0 8 Section
1961(1)(D) incorporates the securities fraud predicate by using the fol-
lowing language-"any offense involving. . . fraud in the sale of securities
... punishable under any law of the United States." An offense punishable is
a criminal violation. All violations of section 17(a) or rule 1Ob-5 are not
criminal offenses. A section 17(a) violation is a securities fraud crime
only if the "willfulness" requirement of the section 24 "Penalties" provi-
sion of the 1933 Act is satisfied.30 9 Similarly, a rule lOb-5 violation is a
securities fraud crime only if the "willfulness" requirement of the section
32(a) "Penalties" provision of the 1934 Act is satisfied.3 10 Thus criminal
308 See, e.g., Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that civil
RICO mail fraud requires intent to defraud); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir.
1983) ("criminal intent is... necessary in either mail fraud or securities fraud" under civil RICO);
Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (civil RICO covers
predicate offenses that must be criminal); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (civil RICO requires "willful" conduct). Professor Blakey suggests: "Because some confusion
exists about whether RICO incorporates the 'civil' or the 'criminal' provisions of the securities stat-
utes, Congress should clarify that RICO includes only the criminal provisions." [Footnote omitted.]
Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for
Reform: 'Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 928 (1990).
309 See, e.g., Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The
Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 901, 929, 954, ("intent is an
essential element of a section 17(a) offense"; "in a section 17(a) criminal prosecution, the Govern-
ment must prove specific intent to defraud, or scienter."); Mathews, Defense of Federal Securities Laws
Criminal Prosecutions, in NA~rAus, WHirrE COLLAR CRIMES 130 (1980) ("specific criminal intent, that is,
an intent to defraud, is an essential element of a § 17(a) offense."). See also Troutman v. United
States, 100 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1960); Estep v. United States, 223 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1955); Rice v.
United States, 149 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1945); United States v.Jones, 380 F. Supp. 343 (D.N.J. 1974)
United States v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 480 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd, 281 F.2d 492 (Ist Cir. 1960); United
States v. Gasomiser Corp., 7 F.R.D. 712 (D. Del. 1947).
Requisite criminal intent to defraud, however, need not be proven by direct evidence; circum-
stantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. Thus, the requisite criminal sci-
enter may be inferred solely from the conduct of the defendant. See, e.g., Swallow v. United States,
307 F.2d 81, 83 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Brown, 236 F.2d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 1956); United
States v. Vasen, 222 F.2d 3, 7-8 (7th Cir. 1955); Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1967);
Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966). "Indeed criminal convictions under § 17(a)
have been consistently upheld when based upon statements made with a 'reckless indifference' to
their truth or falsity, even though the government was unable to prove that a defendant had actual
knowledge of the falsity of his statements." Mathews, Defense of Federal Securities Laws Criminal Prosecu-
tions, in NAFrALIS, WHrrE COLLAR CRIMES 131 (1980). See also United States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 60
(3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964). In Benjamin,Judge Friendly
stated: "We think that in the context of § 24 of the Securities Act as applied to § 17(a), the Govern-
ment can meet its burden by proving that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a
duty to see ... or recklessly stated as facts things of which he was ignorant." Id. at 862.
310 The § 17(a)/§ 24 criminal "willfulness" standard of the 1933 Act is also applied to the "will-
fulness" requirement of a criminal 1934 Act violation under rule lOb-5/§ 32(a). Thus, in United
States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1970), the Second Circuit held that to satisfy § 32(a)'s "will-
fulness" requirement, there must exist " 'a realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a
wrongful act' . . . with the qualifications.., that the act be wrongful under the securities laws and
that the knowingly wrongful act involve a significant risk of affecting the violation that has occurred."
See also, United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Koenig, 388 F.
Supp. 670, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[T]he Government must prove, in order to establish criminal
intent, a defendant misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts, (a) knowing that the facts rep-
resented were false or (b) not knowing that the facts represented were false or that he failed to dis-
close material facts but acting with willful or reckless disregard for the truth or being under a duty to
know of such falsity or failure to disclose."); Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 21 VA. L. REv. 139, 149 (1934). But see United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.
1972) ("Proof of a specific intent to violate the law is not necessary to uphold a conviction under
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scienter, i.e., specific intent to defraud, must be proven to sustain a civil
RICO securities fraud predicate offense.
It is true that a criminal case must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas a civil RICO claim need only be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.31' However, apart from the different standards by
which the proof is measured (and the fact that injury causation must be
established in a civil RICO claim), the essential elements of each part of a
RICO daim-that is, pattern, enterprise, and the particular predicate of-
fenses relied upon-are identical in both the civil and criminal contexts.
Thus, it is a prerequisite for a civil RICO recovery that a plaintiff prove
that crimes Were committed by the defendants.3 1 2 Courts and commenta-
tors concur in this observation,31 3 although some plaintiffs' lawyers re-
fuse to acknowledge it.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, virtu-
ally every court of appeals has held that some form of "recklessness" will
satisfy the scienter requirement of an implied private civil damages rem-
edy under rule lOb-5. It is unclear, however, what degree of reckless-
ness, if any, will satisfy the criminal intent requirement of a civil RICO
§ 32(a) of the [1934] Act, provided that satisfactory proof is established that the defendant intended
to commit the act prohibited.").
311 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,491 (1985); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879
F.2d 1290, 1297 (6th Cir. 1989); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 1987);
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 530-32 (9th Cir. 1986); Armco Indus. Credit
Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), aft'g, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984); Alcorn County, Miss.
v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974); Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Burden of Proof, 60 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 566 (1985), But see Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 384 (Recommending
"that the RICO statute be amended to make it clear that the required predicate acts of'racketeering
activity' must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to recovery under Civil
RICO").
312 In this respect, RICO is significantly different than the antitrust laws, where it is possible to
bring a civil treble damage claim even in the absence of criminal conduct. Civil RICO Task Force
Report, supra note 7, at 381 n.621; Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil
Remedies for 'Criminal Activity', 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 208-09 (1975).
313 See RICO Litigation Update, in MATHEWS, S=XrH ANNUAL RICO LITIGATION UPDATE 248 (1990)
(None of [civil] RICO's predicate offenses is applicable on a showing of strict liability. Each requires
a showing ofmens rea or 'criminal intent.'); Abrams, A New Proposal For Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1989) (suit to be whether it involved a criminal RICO matter, that is one which
would have been prosecuted criminally); Lynch, A Conceptua Practical and Political Guide to RICO
Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 769, 797 (1990) ("Every civil RICO claim that survives a motion to dismiss
by definition charges the defendant with a criminal violation of RICO."). See also Bender v. South-
land Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) (civil RICO mail fraud requires intent to defraud);
Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1984); The
Trane Co. v. O'Conner Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1983) (RICO securities fraud predicate offense
"obviously refers to criminal punishment; only willful violations of the Securities and Exchange Act
are criminally punishable."); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Criminal
intent is ... necessary in either mail fraud or securities fraud [under civil RICO]."); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974); McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp.
1492, 1511 n.4 (D.N.J. 1985); Rich-Taubman Assocs. v. Stamford Restaurant Operating Co., 587 F.
Supp. 875, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 581 F. Supp. 350, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D.D.C. 1983); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F.
Supp. 131, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Cf. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir.
1980) ("the predicate acts obviously refer to criminal punishment and only willful securities and
bankruptcy frauds are criminally punishable.").
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treble damages claim based upon securities, wire or mail fraud predicate
offenses.31 4
The reason there is confusion over whether and when "reckless-
ness" will be sufficient constructive criminal intent under civil RICO, and
if so, what degree of recklessness is required, is that the underlying sub-
stantive criminal law relating to criminal intent is not precise. Some fed-
eral courts have held that proof of "reckless disregard" or "reckless
indifference" is sufficient to satisfy the willfulness or criminal intent re-
quirement of federal securities, mail or wire fraud crimes.315 However,
the recent formulation by appellate courts of the proper test has been to
require proof of a defendant's "conscious avoidance" or "willful blind-
ness."13 16 The ABA Task Force commented that this newer test "appears
to be a stricter test than the 'recklessly tolerated' test of the Model Penal
Code." The problem with any criminal intent test that uses the word
"reckless" is that juries may well confuse recklessness with mere
negligence.3 17
314 Compare O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,509 (D. Ariz.
1984) ("Civil liability under RICO requires knowing or intentional participation [in the racketeering
activity] and not 'mere negligence or recklessness' ") with Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 687 F.
Supp. 255 (E.D. Ia. 1987) ("reckless disregard" or "reckless indifference" satisfies civil RICO's
criminal intent requirement).
315 See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1964) ("the Government can
meet its burden by proving that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to the facts he had a duty to
see.., or recklessly stated as facts things of which he was ignorant .. "); see also United States v.
Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 322 n.9 (2d Cir. 1975) ("reckless deliberate indifference to or disregard for
truth"); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
316 See, e.g., United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 312 (Ist Cir. 1980) ("conscious avoidance");
United States v. Eisenberg, 596 F.2d 522, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1979) ("conscious avoidance"); United
States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1977) ("conscious avoidance"); United States v.
Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699-703 (9th Cir. 1976) ("wilful blindness"); United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d
461,469 (2d Cir. 1976) ("deliberate disregard"); United States v.Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 n.37 (2d
Cir. 1973) ("conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth"); United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d
877, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1972) ("conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth"); United States v.
Squires, 440 F.2d 859, 864 n.12 (2d Cir. 1971) (conviction overturned because trial court failed to
charge jury on "conscious avoidance"). See also G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART
157-59 (2d ed. 1961):
To the requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly limited exception .... [t]he
rule is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further
inquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge....
The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found through-
out the criminal law.
See also R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1969) ("knowledge" includes circumstances where
one "deliberately 'shut his eyes' to avoid knowing"); Edwards, The Criminal Degree of Knowledge, 17
MODERN L. REv. 294, 298, 302 (1954) ("wilful shutting of eyes," "wilful blindness," "purposely
abstaining from ascertaining," and "wilfully abstaining from knowing").
317 See United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1977), where the Second Circuit noted:
We are troubled.., by the repeated use of the term "reckless." This Court has previously
had occasion to criticize the use of this "technical and confusing" term .... The distinction
between recklessness and negligence is elusive enough for even the most respected legal
scholars. See Prosser on Torts, 32, 184-86 (4th ed. 1972). It follows that to the layman on
the jury, it might prove a significant source of confusion. It is thus preferable, in cases such
as this, to omit the use -if the term. It adds nothing to the "conscious avoidance" language
which we have approve.., and might tend to mislead the jury.
Id at 1101-02 (citing at second ellipsis: United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 470 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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Courts in the 1990s will be forced to compare the criminal law con-
structive fraudulent intent test of "conscious avoidance" to the civil liti-
gation rule lOb-5 test of scienter on a "recklessness" basis, to determine
if the two tests are substantively differently. If so, courts will then be
faced with the decision of which formulation should be used in civil
RICO cases based upon commercial fraud predicate offenses.
4. Respondeat Superior3 18
The doctrine of respondeat superior, i.e., the liability without fault
of a principal/employer for the torts of an agent/employee-is not men-
tioned in the RICO statute or its legislative history. Whether respondeat
superior may apply in civil RICO cases is an important, unresolved
issue.31 9
RICO's "liberal construction clause" may indicate that general fed-
eral jurisprudence, including derivative or vicarious liability principles,
should apply to civil RICO. If the court employs an antitrust analogy (as
the Supreme Court did in Malley-Dufl)3 2 0 then respondeat superior would
apply across the board to civil RICO cases just as it does to federal anti-
trust private treble damages actions.32' However, early district court de-
cisions reached opposite results in dealing with respondeat superior in
the civil RICO context.
For example, in Bernstein v. IDT Corporation 3 22 the court imposed re-
spondeat superior civil RICO liability upon defendant General Dynamics
for the criminal conduct of its top officers in circumstances where the
crimes/torts of the employees/agents benefitted, and were intended to
benefit, the corporation.3 23 The Bernstein court, relying on the recent
Supreme Court antitrust analogy (American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corporation. 324), observed that "the normal rules of
318 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also Civil Rico Task Force Report, supra note 7, at
342-65.
319 See, e.g., Black, Applications of Respondeat Superior Principles to Securities Fraud Claims Under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825 (1984); Dwyer & Kieley,
Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 324
(1985); Starr, Vicarious Liability, 3 RICO L. REP. 34 (1986); Note,Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant
Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplication of Vcarious Corporate Liability, 65 B.U.L. REv. 561 (1985).
320 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
321 See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (gen-
erally, an agent acting within the scope of his employment or apparent authority will render his
principal liable to third parties for harm caused by the agent's antitrust violations). The Court
stated:
Under an apparent authority theory, "[il]iability is based upon the fact that the agents'
position facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the
third person the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in
the ordinary course of business confided to him."... ASME's system of codes and interpre-
tive advice would not be effective if the statements of its agents did not carry with them the
assurances that persons in the affected industries could reasonably rely upon their apparent
trustworthiness.
Id at 566 (quoting PESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261, comment a (1957)).
322 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1982).
323 This is the federal criminal test for respondeat superior-requiring benefit to the principal.
See generally K. BRicKEY, CoRPORATE CRIMINAL LIABiLmTr, ch. 3 (1984). Compare RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-37 (1958).
324 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
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agency law apply in the absence of some indication that Congress had a
contrary intent." 325 The court found nothing in RICO's language or leg-
islative history suggesting that normal rules of agency do not apply. To
the contrary, the court held that the application of the doctrines of ap-
parent authority and respondeat superior will further the statutory goals
of civil RICO.3 26
In Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. ,327 the court reached just the op-
posite conclusion in rejecting the application of respondeat superior to
civil RICO. Low-level employees of a large brokerage house had de-
frauded a client. The court viewed the corporate employer as an "enter-
prise" that was the victim of the racketeering activity. The court
reasoned that the goals of civil RICO would be distorted if a victim enter-
prise had treble damage liability for the torts which the agents had com-
mitted in order to infiltrate the enterprise. 328
As circuit courts have gradually wrestled with respondeat superior
issues in civil RICO cases, a trend appears to be developing: respondeat
superior liability is usually rejected as to section 1962(c) claims, but may
well be sanctioned in section 1962(a) and (b) claims.3 29
Vicarious liability issues are complicated by several considerations.
First, the required distinction between "enterprise" and "person," under
section 1962(c), 33 0 may form the basis for precluding derivative liability
that circumvents that rule.3 3 1 Second, there is a distinction to be drawn,
often not focused upon by the courts, between (i) direct civil RICO liabil-
ity based upon derivative criminal liability for the predicate acts and (ii)
derivative civil RICO liability based upon common law principles of
agency and respondeat superior.33 2 The cases simply have not done a
thorough job of parsing this difficult issue.
325 582 F. Supp. at 1083.
326 Id. at 1083-84. Accord, In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
327 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
328 Id. at 23-24.
329 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (no respondeat
superior under § 1962(c)); S.L. Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 852 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.
1988) (no vicarious liability under § 1962(c)); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d
1349 (3d Cir. 1987) (no vicarious liability under § 1962(c), but respondeat superior may apply to
§ 1962(a)); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) (no respondeat superior under
§ 1962(c), but may lie for § 1962(a) and § 1962(b)); Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.
1987) (no respondeat superior under § 1962(c)); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28
(1st Cir. 1986) (no respondeat superior in § 1962(c) claim). See also Landry v. Airline Pilots' Assoc.,
892 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1990).
330 For cases and articles dealing with the person/enterprise distinction, and its concomitant
problems, see MATnEws, SixmH ANNUAL RICO LITIGATION UPDATE 18, 95-109 (1990); Note, Functions
of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646, 654-76 (1989); Note, Innocence by Associa-
tion: Entities and the Person-Enterprise Rule Under RICO, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 179 (1988).
331 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Petro-Tech,
Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229
(8th Cir. 1987); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Kid-
der, Peabody & Co., 674 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1987); FSLIC v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 658
F.Supp 1331 (D.P.R. 1987); Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
332 See Pandick v. Rooney, 688 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Rowland v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
689 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986); In re
Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill 1984).
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When, if ever, the Supreme Court addresses respondeat superior
and other vicarious or derivative liability theories under civil RICO, it
will be forced to.focus upon a multitude of policy issues implicated by the
various roles that a "corporation/enterprise" may play in a RICO case-
i.e., perpetrator, passive instrument, victim or prize. 33 Each role may
require a different treatment for vicarious liability purposes.3 3 4
The Seventh Circuit commented in Haroco, Inc. v. American National
Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago:335
At the policy level of the [person/enterprise] dispute, there are several
significant competing arguments. The Eleventh Circuit argued in
Hartley that where the defendant corporation is the central figure in a
criminal scheme, as it was in that case, Congress could not have meant
to let the central perpetrator escape RICO liability while subjecting
only the sidekicks to RICO's severe penalties. Similarly, plaintiffs here
argue that Congress intended to make a "deep pocket" (in the person
of the corporation) liable where corporate agents engage in a pattern
of racketeering activity redounding to the benefit of the corporation.
In Parnes, Judge Shadur argued that it would make little sense to hold
a corporation liable under RICO for the misconduct of lower level em-
ployees, at least where it appears that the corporation is a passive in-
strument or even a victim of the racketeering activity.
In our view, the RICO provisions have already taken into account
these competing policies in different situations, and a careful parsing
of section 1962 reveals a sensible balance among these policies. We
find helpful here Professor Blakey's discussion in The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context, 58 No=E DAME L. REV. 237, 307-25. Blakey points
out that under the subsections of section 1962, the enterprise may play
the various roles of victim, prize, instrument or perpetrator. The
RICO liability of the enterprise should depend on the role played. In
our view, the plaintiffs here and the court in Hartley are correct when
they argue that the corporate enterprise should be liable where it is
the perpetrator, or the central figure in the criminal scheme. In that
situation, the corporate deep pocket should certainly be subject to
RICO liability. At the same time, the defendants here and Judge
Shadur in Parnes are surely correct in saying that the corporation-en-
terprise should not be liable when the corporation is itself the victim
or target, or merely the passive instrument for the wrongdoing of
others.33 6
333 See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 237, 308-23 (1983); Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 646, 673-77 (1989).
334 Cf., Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384,402 (7th Cir. 1984), afd, 473
U.S. 606 (1985); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
335 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
336 747 F.2d at 401 (citations omitted). In addition, the Haroco court stated:
In our view, the tensions between these policies may be resolved sensibly and in accord with
the language of section 1962 by reading subsection (c) together with subsection (a). As we
read subsection (c), the "enterprise" and the "person" must be distinct. However, a corpo-
ration-enterprise may be held liable under subsection (a) when the corporation is also a
perpetrator. As we parse subsection (a), a "person" (such as a corporation-enterprise) acts
unlawfully if it receives income derived directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering
activity in which the person has participated as a principal within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, and if the person uses the income in the establishment or operation of an enterprise
affecting commerce. Subsection (a) does not contain any of the language in subsection (c)
which suggests that the liable person and the enterprise must be separate. Under subsec-
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The First Circuit in Schofield v. First Commodity Corporation of Boston,3s7
rejected respondeat superior in a section 1964(c) case, because it felt ap-
plication of vicarious liability principles to RICO would circumvent the
person/enterprise rule. Other courts of appeals have been strongly in-
fluenced by, and have expressly adopted, the Schofield approach.33 8 But
Schofield may not have given deep enough analysis to Haroco's observa-
tions about the differing roles of a corporation/enterprise as victim, per-
petrator, passive instrument or prize.339
Neither the Schofield court nor any other appellate courts struggling
with vicarious liability under civil RICO have discussed the ABA Civil
RICO Task Force Report approach to this complex jurisprudential prob-
lem. Naturally, as Chairman of the ABA Task Force, I believe the re-
port's analysis of and recommendations on this issue are pertinent:
The Task Force recommends that the RICO provision should be
amended to reflect that the respondeat superior or derivative liability
test that should be applied in civil RICO cases for holding legitimate
businesses liable for treble damages for the RICO violations of their
low-level agents and employees should, with one exception, be pat-
terned upon but slightly different from the lines of the strict Model
Penal Code/State Law criminal respondeat superior or derivative lia-
bility test. Under this strict test, a corporation will not be liable for
treble damages under civil RICO in instances where (i) there is not
direct criminal involvement of either high-level managerial agents or
top officers or directors, and (ii) high-level officials or managerial
agents had no knowledge of the criminal activities (knowledge exists if
there has been "conscious avoidance" or "willful blindness" of offend-
ing activities by such high-level officials or managerial agents). The
one exception is that actual damage derivative or respondeat superior
liability should exist in the limited circumstances where there exists a
distinct RICO injury for which no compensation is available in claims
based upon the individual criminal acts that constitute the predicate
offenses.3 4 0
5. Injunctive Relief
In some corporate/securities civil RICO cases, the appropriateness
of allowing a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief, rather than damages,
could be an important issue, e.g., in corporate takeover or tender offer
tion (a), therefore, the liable person may be a corporation using the proceeds of a pattern of
racketeering activity in its operations. This approach to subsection (a) thus makes the cor-
poration-enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is actually the direct or indi-
rect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not when it is merely the victim,
prize, or passive instrument of racketeering. This result is in accord with the primary pur-
pose of RICO, which, after all, is to reach those who ultimately profit from racketeering, not
those who are victimized by it.
Id. at 401-02 (footnotes and citations omitted).
337 793 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1986).
338 See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
339 One student comment criticizes the Schofield court for applying civil, rather than criminal,
respondeat superior principles in a RICO case. See Note, Civil RICO and Vicarious Corporate Liability:
Shrinking Civil RICO Back to Its Originally Intended Congressional Size, 15 OHo N.U.L. REv. 695, 706-07
(1988).
340 Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 364-65 (emphasis in original).
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litigation.34 ' It is not dear whether private parties may obtain injunctive
or other equitable relief in civil RICO lawsuits., The Ninth Circuit in Reli-
gious Technology Center v. Wollersheim,342 held that injunctive relief is not
available to private civil RICO claimants. After reviewing conflicting
lower court precedent, statutory language and legislative history, as well
as countervailing policy arguments, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
"Congress did not intend to give private RICO plaintiffs any right to in-
junctive relief."3 43  However, the law in other circuits remains
unsettled.344
Professor Blakey strongly disagrees with the Wollersheim decision,
and, indeed, has written a scholarly article criticizing it. No circuit court
has yet credited Professor Blakey's view that traditional equitable relief,
including injunctive relief, should be fully available to a private party
plaintiff in civil RICO litigation. The ABA Civil RICO Task force favored
granting limited equitable/injunctive relief to private party civil plaintiffs:
The Task Force recommends that Section 1964 be clarified to allow a
private action for a limited, restrictive class of injunctive or other equi-
table relief as follows:
(1) To allow preliminary relieve in a private treble damage ac-
tion to the extent needed to prevent the dissipation of assets; and
(2) To allow permanent injunctive relief to the extent needed to
restrain future RICO violations by the defendant, but to exclude any
of the broader injuctive or other equitable relief of the type available
to the Government.3 45
6. Injury/Causation 46
Section 1964(c), RICO's private party civil treble damages remedy,
states in part that "any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue.., for treble
341 Cf.Johnson, Predators Rights: Multiple Remedies for Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Law and
RICO, 10J. CORP. L. 3 (1984); Tyson &: August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in
Favor of Incumbent Management?, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 53 (1983).
342 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
343 Id. at 1088.
344 See Belgard, Private Civil RICO Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Equitable Relief Under § 1964(a), 2 RICO
L. REP. 537 (1985); Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 526 (1987); Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at ch. 12; Strafer, Massumi &
Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest, 19 AM. CraM. L. REv. 455 (1982); Weissman, In the High
Stakes Game of Civil RICO, Can Private Claimants Raise the Ante Even Further with Claims for Equitable
Relief?, I RICO L. REP. 234 (1984); Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in
RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945 (1984).
For cases denying injunctive or other equitable relief to private parties, see In re Fredeman
Litig., 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988); Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 8 RICO L. Rep. 757 (D. Kan.
1988); Volckman v. Edwards, 642 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc. v.
Guerdon Indus. Inc., 644 F. Supp. 951 (D. Del. 1986).
For cases granting injunctive or other equitable relief to private parties, see United States v.
Bonanno Org. Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-
Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D.Pa. 1984). Cf Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 730
F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc. v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp.
993, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
345 Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 341 (emphasis in original).
346 See Mathews & Weissman, Outline on "RICO Litigation Update," in A. MATHEWS, SIXTH ANNuAL
RICO LITIGATION UPDATE, 124-54 (1990).
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damages. '3 47 Prior to Sedima, some lower courts had attempted to nar-
row civil RICO's scope by holding that only "competitive" injury in the
antitrust sense was compensable under the statute.3s Other courts held
that a special "racketeering enterprise" injury was required.a49 How-
ever, in Sedima, and the companion Haroco case,350 the Supreme Court
rejected both the competitive injury and racketeering enterprise injury
limitations. The Court stated in Sedima that the language of the statute
"belied" any need for a special injury requirement insofar as a section
1962(c) case is concerned.
Where the plaintiff alleges each element of the violation, the compen-
sable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently
related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the
commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enter-
prise. Those acts are, when committed in the circumstances deline-
ated in [the RICO statute], "an activity which RICO was designed to
deter."3 5 1
In Haroco, the Supreme Court added that "[t]he submission that the in-
jury must flow.., from the fact that [the predicate acts] were performed
as part of the conduct of an enterprise suffers from the same defects as
the amorphous and unfounded restrictions on [] RICO . . . rejected in
[Sedima]."352
Thus, the "proximate cause" of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,353
appears to be the principal injury/causation test for civil RICO's section
1962(c) cases. 354 However, the ambiguity inherent in a proximate cause
requirement remains as evident in RICO cases as in cases of negligence.
In addition, injury/causation problems endure with respect to section
1962(a) and 1962(b) claims.3 55
347 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
348 See, e.g., Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp.
210 (D. Colo. 1983);Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark Sav. & Loan
v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F.
Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
349 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922
(1985); Margolis v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 585 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); King v. Lasher, 572 F.
Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal.
1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
350 Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
351 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
352 Haroco, 473 U.S. at 609.
353 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
354 See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990); Reynolds v. East
Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1989); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988);
Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
1987).
355 Courts are just beginning to flesh out what special type of investment injury, if any, is re-
quired in a § 1962(a) case, or what type of special acquisition injury, if any, is required in a § 1962(b)
case. See cases cited in Mathews & Weissman, Civil RICO Outline, in A. MATHEWS, Srxrn ANNUAL
RICO LiTIGATION UPDATE 18, 143-49 (1990); see also Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1989); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989); Foster, Netzer & Moriarty, Editorial
Analysis, Causation In Civil RICO After Sedima, 4 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) 2 (No. 46 April 25, 1989);
Razzano, Subsection 1962(a) Under Seige, 3 RICO Law Rep. 809 (1986). Cf. Note, Civil RICO Standing:
Direct/Indirect Distinction Should Not Be Taken Sitting Down, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1239 (1990); Note, The
Continuing Conflict Over Limitations on RICO's Civil Injwy Element, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 531 (1986).
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In Sperber v. Boesky, 356 the Second Circuit discussed RICO's proxi-
mate causation requirement extensively. Investors in companies put "in
play" by the defendant sued him because the revelation of his alleged
insider trading schemes resulted in a drop in value of all the takeover
stocks. Plaintiffs had not invested in any particular stocks in which the
defendant had been trading. The Sperber court noted that although
RICO is to be read broadly under Sedima, legal liability does not extend
as far as "factual causation."35 7 The court stated, "[a]s a leading treatise
explains, '[i]n a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go for-
ward to eternity,' and extending liability as far as factual causation there-
fore 'would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts,' and would 'set
society on edge and fill courts with endless litigation .... ' "358
But the majority in Sedima contemplated that some types of indirect
injury are recoverable; i.e., the reference to "competitive injury" in foot-
note 15.359 Therefore, the court in Sperber rejected the notion that only
direct injury is recoverable under RICO.
The leading case dealing with the "by reason of" language of
RICO is Sedima, which held that damages caused directly by the predi-
cate acts of a RICO violation are recoverable. It did not focus on the
issue raised by this appeal: to what extent are damages caused only
indirectly by the predicate acts recoverable? (By damages caused only
"indirectly" we mean "racketeering" injury, "competitive" injury or
injury caused by the total effect of the pattern of racketeering in the
enterprise .... ).360
Sperber emphasized that both direct and indirect injury must be proxi-
mately caused by defendant's acts. Plaintiffs did not meet this proximate
cause requirement in Sperber because "plaintiffs here were neither the tar-
get of the racketeering enterprise nor the competitors nor the customers
of the racketeer." 36' The court also rejected the argument that foresee-
ability is the sole proximate causation test. This argument proves too
much since many remote injuries are foreseeable.3 62
356 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
357 Id. at 63.
358 Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, D. DUBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTs 264 (5th ed. 1984).
359 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15.
360 Sperber, 849 F.2d at 63 (citing Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408,411 n.7
(8th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), adhered to in relevant part, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986)).
361 Sperber, 849 F.2d at 65.
362 Id. at 65-66:
Plaintiffs argue that the scope of liability is determined only by the foreseeability of injury,
that massive insider trading and self-promotion foreseeably leadito a rise in the market
price for the relevant stocks, and that it was foreseeable that the price would fall when the
illegal props that were holding it up were removed. This appealingly simple argument
proves too much. It is foreseeable that as a result of the disclosure of Boesky's activities, his
company would dose and that some employees lose their jobs, that some of those employ-
ees would not be able to find newjobs and that their children would not be able to buy new
clothes, injuring a clothing manufacturer. However, we have no doubt that the clothing
manufacturer is too far from the racketeering to recover under RICO.
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In a recent Seventh Circuit decision, Bastian v. Petren Resources
Corp. ,363 the court held that a rule lOb-5 claim was properly dismissed
due to plaintiff's inability to establish required "loss causation," because
the decline in value of the investment was not attributable to the alleged
material misrepresentation. Similarly, if the plaintiffs would have lost
money regardless of the RICO violation, they would have incurred no
loss for which RICO provides a remedy, since RICO requires a loss "by
reason of [the] violation. ' 's64
Another case growing out of Ivan Boesky's role in the Wall Street
scandals of the 1980s demonstrates both the complexity of the causation
of injury/damages issues in civil RICO cases involving federal securities
laws claims, as well as the use of civil RICO to circumvent the deficiencies
in underlying substantive securities fraud claims and other damage
claims under related provisions of the federal securities laws.3 65
In FMC Corp. v. Boesky, the plaintiff, a multi-billion dollar corpora-
tion, sued Boesky and a number of national investment banking firms
(including Goldman, Sachs & Co., Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., and
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.), claiming damages in excess of $235 mil-
lion, caused by Boesky's allegedly illegal insider-trading activities. The
district court initially dismissed the FMC complaint on lack of standing
grounds because it found that FMC had not suffered any legally cogniza-
ble injury.3 66 The district court rejected FMC's claim that Boesky's con-
duct had caused it to set an unduly high exchange ratio for various
securities it issued and redeemed in a complex corporate reorganization
and restructuring plan. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
district court had not adequately explained whether FMC had "constitu-
tional standing" in the sense of "whether FMC was injured for the pur-
pose of Article III's case or controversy requirement." 367 The Seventh
Circuit found that FMC's complaint contained sufficient allegations to
satisfy Article III's injury requirement.3 68
Although FMC's allegations of injury satisfied Article III's case or
controversy requirement, the Seventh Circuit instructed the district court
on remand "to determine whether FMC's federal claims fall within the
zones of interests protected by the federal statutes under which FMC
seeks relief."36 9 After remand, the district court pointed out that to re-
cover on its securities fraud and civil RICO damages claims, FMC would
363 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).
364 Id. at 686. See also Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988). Brandenburg was a
class action against S&L and state insurance agency officials for misrepresentations that led to depos-
its in S&Ls which were later frozen in the Maryland S&L crisis and on which interest was lost. The
court held that the plaintiffs did not adequately tie these losses to the misrepresentations alleged-
i.e., those that induced savings deposits. Instead, the cause of the losses was more closely tied to the
failure of the defendants to prevent unsound banking practices and self-dealing by bank officers.
Such negligence, however, did not rise to the required level of fraud that would support civil RICO
commercial fraud offenses, whether they be couched as mail, wire or securities fraud.
365 See FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.
1988), on remand, 727 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
366 Id. at 251.
367 852 F.2d 981, 982 n.1.
368 Id. at 994.
369 Id.
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be required to establish that it suffered "actual economic damage" as a
consequence of defendants' illegal acts.370
The district court held that both the securities fraud counts and the
civil RICO counts required FMC to establish actual injury (i.e., damages)
caused by the defendants' alleged statutory violations.8 71 However, what
is important about the court's opinion is a distinction the court made
concerning standing for substantive securities law claims, versus standing
to support civil RICO treble damages claims. The court found plaintiff
could not establish the required injury/causation/damages to provide
standing under any of the substantive securities law claims pursued (section
17(a) and rule lOb-5 fraud, tender offer fraud under section 14(e)(3),
market manipulation under section 9(a), and false schedule 13D filings
with the SEC under section 18(a)).3 72 However, the court found plaintiff
could establish standing by proving the required injury/ causation/dam-
ages based on the same underlying conduct to support civil RICO treble
damages claims under each of the four categories of RICO violations em-
braced by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c), and (d).3 73
370 727 F. Supp. at 1188 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1988)(§ 28 of the 1934 Act)). See also Pelletier
v. Stuart-James Co., Inc., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989); Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v.
Video Shack, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 127, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); The Limited, Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 683
F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
371 As to the rule lOb-5 fraud claims, see Latigo Ventures v. Laventhol & Horvath, 876 F.2d
1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1989);
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987); Disher v. Information Re-
sources, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 75, 79 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 873 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1989); and as to the civil
RICO claims, see Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Flaherty v. Torquato, 623 F. Supp. 55, 58 (W.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd without
opinion, 800 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1986)-
372 With regard to the § 17(a) fraud claim, the court relied upon the holding of Schifke v. Seafirst
Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1989) that there is no implied private damages action under§ 17(a). 727 F. Supp. at 1197. As to the rule lOb-5 claim, the court found that FMC did not suffer
damages "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security, relying upon Atchley v. Qonaar
Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1983); Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d
Cir. 1976); Investors Funding Corp. Sec. Litig. v. Dansker, 523 F. Supp. 533, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
See 727 F. Supp. at 1192. In addition, the court dismissed the § 9 and § 18 claims, as well as the rule
lOb-5 claims, on the ground that in effectuating the recapitalization plan, FMC was not a "purchaser
or seller" of securities, relying upon Richardson v. Shearson/Am. Express Co., 573 F. Supp. 133,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (as to § 9) and Rankow v. First Chicago Corp., 678 F. Supp. 202, 207 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (as to § 18). In addition, the court found that FMC could not recover under §§ 9(a) and (e)
because it could not establish that it had been damaged in the sense of paying an "improper pre-
mium" by purchasing shares at a manipulated price, relying upon Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 46 (1977); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-40 (7th Cir. 1974).
With regard to the § 14(e) claim, the court found that FMC's recapitalization was not a tender offer,
relying upon Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); SEC v. Carter Howley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d
945 (9th Cir. 1985); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 58 (1985). See 727 F. Supp. at
1198.
373 Despite dismissing all the substantive securities law claims, the court allowed the civil RICO
claims to be pursued because it found that an employee of defendant Goldman Sachs "misappropri-
ated" FMC's confidential information in violation of a contract with and duty owed to FMC, "passed
it along through the illegal trading ring to Boesky" and thereby "destroyed whatever value it had in
FMC's hands." 727 F. Supp. at 1192, (citing FMC II, 852 F.2d at 991 n.21). The district court
added: "Whatever value the misappropriated property had to FMC, it stands to reason this informa-
tion would have been worth at least what FMC paid to create it. Thus, FMC has adequately alleged a
compensable injury to its property for the purposes of the RICO statutes." Id. at 1192. Although
the motion to dismiss the civil RICO counts was accordingly denied, the court explicitly commented:
"The [RICO] injury does not, however, provide FMC with standing to pursue its securities law
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V. A Jurisprudential Solution
I have previously articulated my views as to how the perceived abuse
or overuse of civil RICO in general commercial litigation and, more spe-
cifically, in federal securities litigation, could be curtailed.3 74 Rather
than tinkering with amending the existing civil RICO statutory provision,
I have advocated that a sounder jurisprudential perspective is to focus
instead upon the question whether it is time to legislate a general federal
commercial/consumer fraud statute-wholly apart from RICO-that
would provide victims of fraud or related commercial torts with an ex-
press private party damages remedy in the federal courts. 375 Obviously,
such consideration would implicate a very important issue of federalism:
Whether federal courts are too busy to have forced upon them the adju-
dication of commercial/consumer fraud/tort claims that at present sup-
posedly are relegated to state and local courts, pursuant to common law
fraud and state law consumer protection provisions.3 76 In my view, repu-
table businesses would not be RICOed if injured plaintiffs had an across-
the-board express federal commercial/consumer fraud damages rem-
claims. As will be explained below, the breaches of contract and fiduciary duty which led to the
misappropriation of FMC's property did not occur in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties." Id. at n.12.
374 I chaired the ABA Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force that in 1985 made ten principal recommen-
dations concerning how civil RICO abuse could be lessened without diluting criminal RICO. Civil
RICO Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 7-16. The various Supreme Court opinions in Sedima seemed
to be affected somewhat by the ABA Task Force's views; the ABA Report was cited 16 times in
Sedima. Congress, on the other hand, has appeared to pay little attention to the ABA Report and its
recommendations, as it has debated RICO reform during the past five years.
375 See Testimony and Prepared Statement of Arthur F. Mathews, on civil RICO before the Senate
Judiciary Committee (July 29, 1985, Wash. D.C.) reprinted in Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings
before the Sen. Comm. on theJudiciay, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 562-85 (May 20, July 31 & Sept. 24, 1985)
(Serial No.J-99-37). See also Mathews, RICO'sjurisprudential Dilemma: Curtailing Civil RICO Abuse With-
out Corrupting the Statute's Primary Goal of Eradicating Racketeering From Legitimate Business, - CATo J. -
(1990): "Rather than trying to manipulate RICO with its specialized pattern and enterprise elements
and its other arcane and ill-defined pleading requirements, to fit the types of civil commercial claims
private plaintiffs are wont to make, perhaps it would make more sense to delete the commercial
fraud offenses solely from civil RICO, i.e., from inclusion in the private treble damages remedy of 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c). Congress in a new noncriminal statute could then provide a federal forum for
private civil claims arising out of mail, wire, bank, and other types of commercial frauds."
376 ChiefJustice Rehnquist touched upon this "federalism" issue in a recent speech advocating
legislative consideration of civil RICO reform:
I take no position as to which of the reform proposals are acceptable or which is best,
but I do think that the imposition of some limitations on Civil RICO actions is required so
that federal courts are not required to duplicate the efforts of the state courts. No one
doubts that the victim of a fraudulent scheme should be able to obtain redress in a court.
The question is under what circumstances should that take place in a federal court?
Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 9. Eastern District of New York ChiefJudge Jack B. Weinstein analyzed
the "federalism" issues implicated by civil RICO in his lengthy opinion in County of Suffolk v.
LILCO, 710 F. Supp. 1428 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir.
1990); Weinstein, RICO and Federalism, in THE RICO RACKET 69 (G. McDowell ed. 1989); Rasmus-
sen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO's Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REv. 623, 628
(1990):
[I]t is also important to keep in mind the concern for federalism. One need not see an
encroachment on federalism behind every bush before questioning the wisdom of the cur-
rent statutory scheme. The list of predicate acts captures a great many areas normally
thought to be exclusive domain of state law. The predicate acts include both overtly state
law crimes and broad federal crimes, such as mail fraud and wire fraud, into which many
state law violations can be shoehorned. Any rethinking of RICO should consider the ap-
propriate division of authority between state and federal courts.
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edy-albeit with whatever limitations or restrictions Congress chooses to
impose regarding multiple/punitive damages, injury/causation, and
standing, as well as any regulatory defenses that Congress deems appro-
priate. But whether Congress is ready to provide an express federal
damages remedy for victims of mail and wire fraud (when courts have for
many decades refused to sanction an implied private damages remedy for
the victims of such crimes/torts) is uncertain. I
It is clear to me that much commercial litigation, including vast
amounts of federal securities litigation today, is being squeezed into the
civil RICO rubric even though the substance of the underlying claims or
disputes has no relationship to such special RICO concepts as "enter-
prise" and "pattern" in the context envisioned by the Congress in pass-
ing the RICO legislation in 1970. I continue to advocate that Congress
should give sufficient attention to how civil RICO is being used, should
make the public policy tradeoffs as to what, if any, limitations should be
put on the statute's scope, and should balance all the competing interests
of various segments of our society to reach an informed judgment as to
whether it is sound jurisprudential policy to continue to adjudicate civil
commercial/consumer fraud/tort disputes under a criminal racketeering
statutory scheme.3 77 Until Congress chooses to change the present
framework of how the civil RICO provision interacts with federal securi-
ties fraud claims through the inclusion of the commercial fraud predicate
offenses in the RICO statute, section 1964(c)'s private treble damages
remedy will remain a potential plaintiff's plea for treble damages, costs
and attorneys' fees in a wide variety of federal securities cases.
377 See Mathews, RICO rJurisprudential Dilemma: Curtailing Civil RICO Abuse Without Corrupting the
Statutes Primary Goal of Eradicating Racketeering From Leitimate Business, - CATOJ. - (1990).
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